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How the International Criminal
Court Threatens Treaty Norms
Michael A. Newton*

ABSTRACT

This Article demonstrates the disadvantages of permitting
a supranational institution like the International Criminal
Court (ICC) to aggrandize its authority by overriding
agreements between sovereign states. The Court's constitutive
power derives from a multilateral treaty designed to augment
sovereign enforcement efforts rather than annul them. Treaty
negotiatorsexpressly rejected efforts to confer jurisdiction to the
ICC based on its aspiration to advance universal values or a
self-justifying teleological impulse to bring perpetrators to
justice. Rather, its jurisdictionderives solely from the delegation
by States Parties of their own sovereign prerogatives. In
accordance with the ancient maxim nemo plus iuris transferre
potest quam ipse habet, states cannot transfer jurisdictional
authority to the supranationalcourt that they themselves do not
possess at the time of the alleged offenses. Upon ratification of
the Rome Statute, both Afghanistan and Palestine conveyed
jurisdiction to the Court, but the scope of that delegation is
limited by their preexisting treaty-based constraints.American
forces and Israelis remain subject to the exclusive criminal
jurisdiction of their own states for criminal offenses committed
on the territory covered by those binding bilateral agreements so
long as those treaties remain applicable. Hence, the Rome
Statute by its own terms does not automatically extend
territorialjurisdiction over American forces in Afghanistan or
over Israeli citizens suspected of offenses in the Occupied
Territory of the West Bank or in the Gaza Strip. Yet, the Office
of the Prosecutor uncritically accepts the premise that
ratification of the multilateral treaty conveyed indivisible
territorialjurisdiction. The ICC is not empowered to sweep
aside binding bilateralagreements between sovereign states. By
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asserting that it has power to abrogate underlying bilateral
treaties, the Court undermines ancient precepts of international
law and harms the principles of treaty law. The ICC is not
constructed as an omnipotent super-court with self-proclaimed
universal jurisdiction based upon the presumption that the
Rome Statute operates in isolation from other treaty-based
constraints on sovereign prerogatives. This Article examines the
conflicts between current Court assumptions and the tenets of
the Rome Statute. Its final Parts dissect the foreseeable damage
caused by the present policy. The conclusion asserts that the
Court cannot unilaterally override the validity of existing
jurisdictional treaties. The assertion of such powers would
violate the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and
muddy the existing debates related to resolving conflicts between
equally binding treaty norms.
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I. INTRODUCTION
(ICC) straddles a
Criminal Court
International
The
jurisdictional fault line that threatens to corrode first principles of
international treaty law. The premise of this Article is that the
current approach of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) in two of
its most sensitive jurisdictional dilemmas undermines international
law even as it obfuscates the specific tenets found in the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (the Rome Statute or the
Statute).1 Upon entry into the ICC Assembly of States Parties (ASP),
both Afghanistan and Palestine conveyed territorial jurisdiction to
the Court within the meaning of Article 12 of the Rome Statute. But
the quantum of that delegated jurisdiction is constrained by their
preexisting treaty-based constraints. In both instances, Afghanistan
and Palestine entered into binding agreements that ceded exclusive
jurisdiction over Americans and Israelis, respectively, for crimes
committed on the territory of the state. The subsequent transfer of
territorial jurisdiction from the state to the ICC via ratification of the
Rome Statute therefore could not have included Americans or
Israelis.
This Article highlights the harm caused by unwarranted
expansion of the Court's jurisdiction over American forces in
Afghanistan and Israeli citizens suspected of offenses in the Occupied
Territory 2 of the West Bank and on the Gaza Strip. The current OTP
approach would reshape established international treaty norms in
fundamental ways. To be precise, the Office of the Prosecutor
presumes jurisdiction over American or Israeli nationals in these two
controversial situations 3 based on assumptions that undermine the

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.
1.
AICONF.183/9, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (July 17, 1998), entered into force July 1, 2002,
reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
For the purposes of this Article, the phrase "Occupied Territory" refers to
2.
all the territory of the Occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip as those areas are
designated a single entity in the Oslo Accords. Land subject to the law of "belligerent
occupation" as that term is understood in the laws and customs of war are called
different names, such as "Yesha," "Yosh," and "Ahza"-Hebrew acronyms accepted in
the Israeli Defense Force-or the "Occupied Territories," the "Administered
Territories," the "Territories," and "Judea and Samaria"-names commonly used by the
general public. Some scholars prefer to use the term "The Region" as reflected in early
Israeli legislation. See, e.g., Entry into Israel Law, 5712-1952, SH No. 111, § 12A. The
original law was passed by the Knesset on the 5th Elul, 5712 (Aug. 26, 1952).
The term "situation" is a sui generis treaty term found in the Rome Statute
3.
to designate the overall context within which the Court is empowered to investigate
cases and bring specific perpetrators to trial. The Final Report of the Preparatory
Committee on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court postulated the
parallel terms "matter" as well as "situation" in bracketed text. U.N. Diplomatic
Conference on Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, Report of the PreparatoryCommittee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. AICONF.183/2 (Apr. 14, 1998), reprinted in United Nations
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basic tenets of established treaty law. The maxim nemo plus iuris
transferre potest quam ipse habet can be traced back more than two
millennia. 4 Literally translated as "No one can transfer to another
more rights (plus iuris) than he has himself,"'5 the concept is one of
the bedrock principles of international law, just as it governs
kindergarten playgrounds the world over. Surprisingly, there has
been almost no recognition of the complex interrelationship between
the rights and duties of states arising from entry into the Rome
Statute, when such entry squarely conflicts with equally binding
bilateral instruments. This Article seeks to fill that void.
Chief Justice John Marshall echoed perhaps the most
foundational aspect of international law in Schooner Exchange v.
McFadden by noting that "[t]he jurisdiction of the nation within its
own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute." 6 Territorial
jurisdiction to make and enforce criminal law is indisputably one of
the quintessential aspects of state sovereignty. 7 Any sovereign state
retains "exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws
committed within its border, unless it expressly or impliedly consents
to surrender its jurisdiction." The Rome Statute revolutionized the
landscape of international law by establishing a complex framework
for
a
permanent
supranational
prosecutorial
authority.
Neverthelesss, the Court's authority is not independent or
omnipotent. Treaty-based ICC jurisdiction flows exclusively from the
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court Rome, 15 June-17 July 1998, Official Records, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. III), at 22, http:/l/egal.un.org/diplomaticconferences/icc-1998/vol/
englishlvolIIIe.pdf [perma.cc/7YKY-937N] (archived Jan 22, 2016).
4.
DIG. 50.17.54 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 46). When Justinian became ruler of
the Byzantine Empire, he ordered compilation of a comprehensive collection of Roman
law that together formed the Corpus Juris Civilis. This resulted in the Code, which
collected the legal pronouncements of the Roman emperors, the Institutes, an
elementary student's textbook, and the Digest, by far the largest and most highly
prized of the three compilations. The Digest was assembled by a team of sixteen
academic lawyers commissioned by Justinian in 533 to cull everything of value from
earlier Roman law. The citation reflects the fact that the maxim is attributed to the
period 211 to 222 AD, during which the Roman jurist Ulpian (Domitius Ulpianus)
wrote a well-respected 80+ book/scroll treatise LIBRI AD EDICTUM.
5.
1 ADOLF BERGER, ENCYCLOPEDIC DIcTIONARY OF ROMAN LAW 740 (1953).
6.
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812); see
also Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 705 (2008) (declining unanimously to shield U.S.
citizens who committed "hostile and warlike acts within the sovereign territory of Iraq"
during ongoing military operations from prosecution before Iraqi courts because habeas
corpus "does not require the United States to shelter such fugitives from the criminal
justice system of the sovereign with authority to prosecute them").
7.
See Islands of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. U.S.), Permanent Court of
Arbitration, 2 U.N. Rep. International Arbitral Awards 829, 838-842 (1928) ("Spain
could not transfer more rights than she herself possessed ....Sovereignty in the
relations between States signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of
the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the
functions of a State.").
8.
Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 529 (1957).
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delegation of a State Party's sovereign jurisdictional power. Except
for the overarching authority of the United Nations Security Council
to convey jurisdiction to the Court through binding resolutions under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the jurisdiction of the ICC, as
embodied in Article 12 of the Rome Statute, is based only on
derivative jurisdiction granted by states at the time they ratify the
multilateral treaty. To be more precise, affirmative Security Council
referrals in the form of a Resolution passed under its Chapter VII
authority are the only mechanism by which the ICC can exercise
universal jurisdiction over offenses.
Properly understood and implemented, the jurisdictional
relationship between the ICC and sovereign states represents a tiered
allocation of authority to adjudicate because states retain the primacy
of jurisdiction under the treaty. The principle that sovereignty can be
subordinated when necessary to achieve accountability for crimes
that most directly challenge the commonality of values and order
shared among nations is the cornerstone of the ICC. Upon ratification
of the Rome Statute, both Afghanistan and Palestine accepted the
premise of Article 12 that empowers the ICC to exercise jurisdiction
over any case where either (a) the actus reus for the alleged crime
occurred on the territory of a State Party to the Rome Statute, or (b)
the perpetrator is a national of a State Party. Article 12(3) also
permits, but does not require, any state that is not party to the ICC to
consensually transfer criminal jurisdiction to the ICC. Preceding
Palestinian Authority (PA) ratification of the Rome Statute,
Mahmoud Abbas purported to create ICC jurisdiction over Israeli
citizens based on just such a declaration signed on December 31,
2014. 9 The incompatibility between the jurisdictional provisions of
the Rome Statute and the preexisting bilateral treaties described in
Part II that simultaneously bind Afghanistan and Palestine
represents an important example of normative fragmentation. To
date, neither State Party has offered any explanation for why the
purported jurisdictional conveyance to the ICC is valid despite the
parallel treaty-based constraints on territorial jurisdiction over
Americans and Israeli nationals that remain in force.
Members of the ICC Assembly of States Parties10 have
conflicting duties to other sovereign states vis-&-vis those due the

See Declaration from President of the State of Palestine to ICC (Dec. 31,
9.
2014), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocslPIDS/presslPalestine A-12-3.pdf [perma.cc/2KEQHRVK] (archived Jan. 22, 2016); see also Andreas Zimmerman, Palestine and the
International Criminal Court Quo Vadis? Reach and Limits of Declarations under
Article12(3), 11 J. INT'L CRIM. J. 304, 313 (2013).
See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 112. The ASP is the management
10.
oversight and legislative body of the International Criminal Court. It is composed of
representatives of states that have ratified or acceded to the Rome Statute. Assembly
of States Parties, ICC, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en-menus/asp/sessions/documentationl
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Court. The fragmentation of duties is a side effect of the otherwise
laudable growth of authoritative lawmakers within international law.
The number of states represented in the United Nations, for example,
has grown by more than 378 percent since its inception. 11 Further
complicating prospects for linear development of norms through
treaty provisions designed to resolve conflicts with other state
obligations, international organizations are increasingly empowered
to negotiate new instruments applicable to sovereign states. 12 In
many instances, states consciously use multilateral conferences
convened by international organizations as venues for "reaffirming,
modifying, or elaborating codified custom.' 13 International treaties
became the dominant form of international lawmaking in a
multipolar world order. 14 Robust academic efforts arose to analyze
potential treaty conflicts and postulate solutions for preserving
15
epistemic integrity and intellectual consistency.
The complexity of interrelated legal obligations spawned by the
dramatic growth in the number and reach of, inter alia human rights

13th-session-resumption/Pages/default.aspx [perma.cc/8KBM-BMDN] (archived Jan.
22, 2016).
States,
http://www.un.orgfen/members/growth.shtml
11.
See
Member
[perma.cc/FNY4-2V8V] (archived Jan. 22, 2016) (documenting the growth from 51
states represented in the General Assembly to 193 with the formation of South Sudan
in 2011).
See generally, JoSt E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW12.
MAKERS (2005) (discussing how international organizations, like the United Nations
and the WTO, have changed the methods by which international law is created,
implemented, and enforced).
13.
Id. at 390. Examination of the many conflicts that originate from
overlapping institutional authority is beyond the scope of this Article. The integrity
and consistency of international law is increasingly eroded when states, international
organizations, and the growing number of specialized courts and tribunals differ over
the substantive meaning of a particular norm of international law. See, e.g., YUVAL
SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTION OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS
(2003); SHANE DARCY, JUDGES, LAW AND WAR: THE JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2014); PHILIPPA WEBB, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL
INTEGRATION AND FRAGMENTATION (2013).
14.
Joel P. Trachtman, The Growing Obsolescence of Customary International
Law, in CUSTOM'S FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD (Curtis A.
Bradley ed., forthcoming 2016); Julie M. Grimes, Conflicts Between EC Law and
International Treaty Obligations: A Case Study of the German Telecommunications
Dispute, 35 HARV. INT'L. L. J. 535 (1994).
15.
See, e.g., JOOST PAUWELYN CONFLICT OF NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003); Christopher
Borgen, Resolving Treaty Conflicts, 37 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 573 (2005); Benedetto
Conforti, Consistency among Treaty Obligations, in THE LAW OF TREATIES: BEYOND THE
VIENNA CONVENTION 187 (Enzo Cannazaro ed., 2011); Jan Klabbers, Beyond the
Vienna Convention: Conflicting Treaty Provisions, in THE LAW OF TREATIES: BEYOND
THE VIENNA CONVENTION, 192 (Enzo Cannazaro ed., 2011). For the minority view that
fragmentation poses no serious challenge to the consistency of the overall fabric of
international law, see Martti Koskenniemi & Paiivi Leino, Fragmentation of
InternationalLaw? PostmodernAnxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 553 (2002).
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treaties, environmental treaties, 16 and overlapping trade regimes is
sometimes shorthanded as the "Trade and . . . " phenomenon. 17 The
to provide
sought
(ILC)
Law
Commission
International
comprehensive guidance to practitioners facing this "emergence of
specialized and (relatively) autonomous rules or rule-complexes, legal
institutions and spheres of legal practice." 18 The resulting Study on
Fragmentation in International Law premised its conclusions on the
finding that "[i]nternational law is a legal system. Its rules and
principles (i.e. its norms) act in relation to and should be interpreted
against the background of other rules and principles. As a legal
system, international law is not a random collection of such norms.
There are meaningful relationships between them." 19 The Study
Group was nevertheless unable to propose comprehensive guidance to
international organizations, practitioners, and state officials for
resolving conflicts when multiple treaty-based norms are equally
binding in a given situation. At the time of this writing, there is no
definitive approach for addressing systematic tensions caused by the
proliferation of treaty provisions that present actual or apparent
conflicts with preexisting treaty provisions.
Without even acknowledging this legal ferment or the persisting
debates in capitals over the most advisable resolution treaty conflicts,
the OTP presumes jurisdiction over crimes committed by Americans
in Afghanistan 20 and is rapidly moving towards making similar
findings with respect to offenses alleged against Israeli citizens for

For an example of this strand of this robust body of scholarship, see Annick
16.
Emmenegger Brunner, Conflicts Between International Trade and Multilateral
EnvironmentalAgreements, 4 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 74 (1997).
Christopher J. Borgen, Treaty Conflicts and Normative Fragmentation,in
17.
THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES 448, 449 (Duncan Hollis ed., 2012); see, e.g., Adarsh
Ramanujan, Conflicts over "Conflict" Preventing Fragmentationof International Law,
1(1) TRADE L. & DEV. 171 (2009).
18.
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Rep. of the Study Group of the
Int'l Law Comm'n, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/L.682, 10-11 (April 13, 2006) [hereinafter ILC
Fragmentation Study], http:/llegal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn41682.pdf
[perma.cc/NM7D-GZWM] (archived Jan. 23, 2016). The ILC Study Group justified the
need for comprehensive assessment and concrete guidance to the field because "What
once appeared to be governed by 'general international law' has become the field of
operation for such specialist systems as 'trade law,' 'human rights law,' 'environmental
law,' 'law of the sea,' 'European law,' and even such highly specialized forms of
knowledge as 'investment law' or 'international refugee law,' etc.--each possessing
their own principles and institutions." Id. at 404.
Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of
19.
International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of
1 (2006), reprinted in Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n on Its FiftyInternationalLaw,
Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/61/10, 407, at 477-78 (Aug. 11, 2006), http://legal.un.org/
docs/?path=../ilc/reports/2006/englishchpl2.pdf&lang=EFSRAC [perma.cc/D82F-8UFD]
(archived Jan. 23, 2016).
20.
See infra notes 134-59 and accompanying text.
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acts committed in the Occupied Territories or in the Gaza Strip. 21 In
both situations, asserting ICC authority over cases alleged against
American or Israeli nationals would effectively abrogate the
preexisting treaty-based jurisdictional allocations made between the
sovereign states. Some observers might describe such efforts to
eliminate any potential hindrance to ICC authority as a healthy
"expression of political pluralism." 2 2 In the best possible light, such
decisions could represent "new institutions" using international law
to "further new interests." 23 Indeed, the dominant narrative is that
ICC is imbued from its creation with an inherently supreme
legitimacy. For its most ardent supporters, the ICC is a necessary
augmentation of the erga omnes duty that all states owe to all other
states to prosecute the crimes "of most serious concern to the
international community as a whole." As a logical extension, the
Court might well be expected to discard binding treaties between
sovereign states that hinder its powers in any way. The OTP appears
at present to operate on the presumption that the overall object and
purpose of the Rome Statute warrants a self-justifying teleological
impulse to expand ICC jurisdiction as needed to bring potential
perpetrators to justice.
From this perspective, the OTP extension of its authority over
non-State Party nationals reflects the prioritization of its own
institutional power at the expense of sovereign states' prosecutorial
rights and interests. However, the foreseeable result of current OTP
policy would discredit the role of the Court as only one of many
authoritative actors in the international domain. It is neither
designed nor intended by its framers to function as an omnipotent
supranational institution; it must adhere to the textual limitations
imposed by sovereign states woven into the text of the Rome Statute.
The very treaty that energizes the ICC does not contain any provision
that hints at preclusive effects over all other treaties. Hence, an ICC
policy that discards bilateral treaties negotiated by states to protect
their citizens from foreign jurisdictions would necessarily subvert the
treaty-based due process rights of potential perpetrators.
No analysis has yet situated this assertion of jurisdiction within
the larger context of the Rome Statute and its relation to overarching
principles of international treaty law. Seeking to extend the Court's
unqualified jurisdiction into those two situations, the OTP disregards
underlying bilateral treaties that preclude personal jurisdiction on
the territory of both Afghanistan and the territory claimed by a fully
sovereign future state of Palestine. This Article argues that the Court
cannot assert jurisdiction over Americans or Israelis in light of the
Rome Statute's provisions on jurisdiction. The reasons are complex

21.
22.
23.

See infra notes 158-91 and accompanying text.
Koskenniemi & Leino, supra note 15, at 553.
Id.
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but strike at the heart of our system of international justice and the
commitments of the Rome Treaty, which provides a defined and
limited constitutive power to the ICC. By extending its jurisdictional
authority in a manner that simply discounts the authority of bilateral
treaties, the ICC would be rewriting the Rome Statute to convey a
universal scope of jurisdiction that is contrary to both the text of the
treaty and the clear negotiating history. This Article demonstrates
the disadvantages of permitting a supranational institution like the
ICC to unilaterally expand its own power by overriding preexisting
agreements between sovereign states.
Furthermore, the Court undermines international law to the
extent that its jurisdictional determinations degrade the sovereign
efforts of states to use treaties as a basis for making formal and
binding commitments to other nations. At a minimum, if it became
the accepted norm of transnational practice, the ICC assertion of
jurisdiction undermines important aspects of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).2 4 All treaties embody extensive
transactional costs due to the time, diplomatic effort, and policy
exertion needed to bring them to successful fruition. States undertake
negotiations in the hopes of achieving concrete rights and receiving
reciprocal obligations from other states; current Court policy would
25
introduce unwarranted uncertainty into those efforts.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part II
illustrates the parameters within which OTP policy decisions have
been made. The Rome Statute operates as a carefully constructed
jurisdictional scheme that rejected a sweeping assertion of universal
jurisdiction. The interactions between the bilateral treaties entered
into by Afghanistan and the Palestinian Liberation Organization
(which entered into the Oslo Accords inherited by the PA) and their
subsequent entry into the ASP remain complex. Neither state
invoked accession to the Statute as justifiable grounds for
26
terminating the preexisting treaty-based jurisdictional limitations.
The OTP presumes an overarching scope of jurisdiction that
disregards any preclusive effects of the earlier treaties described in
Part II.
Part III analyzes the distinctive features of the Rome Statute.
Close examination demonstrates that expanded ICC jurisdiction
contravenes the object and purpose of the Rome Statute in significant
ways. The Court is designed to augment domestic enforcement efforts

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 1969, 8
24.
I.L.M. (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT].
25.
See generally JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006).
Both the United States and Israel would presumably have proceeded
26.
under the law applicable to questions of treaty termination or suspension as well as the
Law of State Responsibility. See VCLT, supra note 24, arts. 30(5), 41, 60.
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rather than annul them. The current jurisdictional posture purports
to supplant sovereign enforcement rather than operating on a
cooperative model. In doing so, the Court paradoxically threatens to
deprive perpetrators of their treaty-based due process rights. Indeed,
the text implicitly contemplates the establishment of the ICC as a
permanent supranational institution with a respected role based on
an explicitly defined relationship with sovereign states. To reiterate,
the ICC is not a court of sweeping universal jurisdiction. In fact, after
the Rome Statute entered into force, the larger body of treaty norms
that contrast with its defined scope of jurisdiction to convey some
form of universal jurisdiction, such as the Torture Convention or the
grave breach provisions of the Geneva Conventions, remain fully
binding on sovereign states.
Part IV considers the effects of the OTP policy within the larger
field of treaty conflicts. By usurping domestic jurisdiction, the Court's
example could bring turmoil to the already murky waters of
international treaty law. The OTP undermines important aspects of
international treaty law because the Court cannot unilaterally
abrogate other treaties in order to eliminate actual or apparent
normative conflicts. Neither Afghanistan nor the PA can lawfully
transfer jurisdiction to the ICC that they do not already exercise in
their sovereign capacity. The Article concludes that the ICC should
not rely on episodic and intuitive decision making that willfully
disregards the other obligations incumbent on States Parties.
Accepting the fact that the Court has no criminal jurisdiction over
American forces in Afghanistan or over Israelis in the Occupied
Territories and the Gaza Strip would represent good faith
implementation of international norms as the hallmark of a maturing
supranational institution.

II. HARMONIZING THE MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL VISIONS
The Rome Statute combines a complex blend of civil law,
common law, customary international law, and sui generis principles
held together by the notion that the sovereign nations of the world
are interdependent components of a larger global society in which the
principles of justice are a common good. 27 This makes the Court the
conceptual pinnacle of an interlocking system designed to achieve
justice within which the core element is a set of shared, but

27.
See Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International
Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L. J. 381, 386 (2000). For an excellent
summary of the negotiating dynamic in Rome that resulted in the current Statute, see

Ruth Wedgewood, Fiddling in Rome: America and the International Criminal Court,
FOREIGN AFF. 20 (Nov.-Dec. 1998). See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles

to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a Permanent International
Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11 (1997).
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delineated, rights and responsibilities. 28 The object and purpose of
the Court nicely accords with the philosophical construct of the
ancient Greeks for whom the pursuit of justice symbolized a quest for
order and harmony. 29 Plato conceived of justice as "that highest class
of good things" on both the personal and societal level. 30
This deeply ingrained aspiration for justice propelled the
development of the ICC for more than fifty years until the adoption of
the Rome Statute in 1998. For Court proponents, it embodies a blend
of appropriately balanced power, wisdom, and temperance, which in
turn has great potential to generate societal stability at the
international level. Thus, while it operates within the milieu of
international politics, the very raison d'etre of the Court is to seek
justice for the most consequential crimes known to man in an
apolitical and impartial manner. This effort to eradicate impunity for
the most egregious categories of international criminality operates
against the backdrop of interconnected and often interdependent
relationships with domestic criminal systems. By extension, the
Court should not function in ways that undermine the utility of
treaties as vehicles for shaping and clarifying the prosecutorial reach
of sovereign states over Rome Statute crimes. Neither should the
Rome Statute be understood and implemented in ways that
destabilize the desirable relationship between domestic jurisdictions
and the permanent supranational Court.
The following section describes in greater detail the specific
mechanisms designed to operate in conjunction with domestic
jurisdictional arrangements. Those treaty-based limitations must be
implemented against the backdrop of the bilateral treaties that
restrict the ability of both Afghanistan and the PA to lawfully confer
jurisdiction over some potential perpetrators to the Court upon their
entry into the ASP. This Part ends by summarizing those
agreements, which in turn necessitates consideration in Parts III and
IV of the normative arguments that mitigate towards recognizing
their residual authority.

28.
See Carsten Stahn, Taking Complementarity Seriously: On the Sense and
Sensibility of 'Classical,' Positive,' and 'Negative Complementarity, in I THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
233, 237 n.16 (Carsten Stahn & Mohammed M. El Zeidy eds., 2011) (noting the lengthy
articulation of this well-established concept in early ICC jurisprudence).
29.
See BRIAN R. NELSON, WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM SOCRATES TO
THE AGE OF IDEOLOGY 31 (1982).
30.
THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 52 (F. MacDonald Cornford trans. & ed., 1945).
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A. The JurisdictionalDesign of the Rome Statue
1. Limitations on the Court's Jurisdiction
The ICC was not created to impede viable domestic processes or
impose dominance over the prosecutorial practices and priorities of
states with developed systems and demonstrated adherence to the
rule of law. 3 1 Hence, the ICC does not have authority to take a case to
trial until the issues associated with domestic jurisdiction have been
analyzed and resolved in accordance with the framework of the Rome
Statute. From the prosecutor's point of view, jurisdiction under the
provisions of Article 12 and admissibility under Article 1732 are
mandatory prerequisites for ICC authority. The creation of a vertical
level of prosecutorial authority operating as a permanent backdrop to
the horizontal relations between sovereign states in large part
depended on clear delineation of the mechanism for prioritizing the
domestic jurisdiction of responsible domestic states and preserving
sovereign rights while simultaneously serving the ends of justice.
The Rome Statute scheme of limited and defined supranational
jurisdiction embodied the rejection of earlier proposals that would
have allowed an "inherent" ICC jurisdiction over some crimes. 33 The
United States, for example, historically supported such an inherent
jurisdictional scheme for the genocide offenses. 34 The 1994 ILC Draft

31.
The irony is that the actual prosecution of Saddam and other leading
Ba'athists took place in an internationalized domestic forum precisely because, inter
alia, Iraqis saw grave injustice arising from prosecuting only the subset of crimes
within ICC jurisdiction. MICHAEL A. NEWTON & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, ENEMY OF THE
STATE: THE TRIAL AND EXECUTION OF SADDAM HUSSEIN 76-80 (2008).
32.
See infra notes 54-78 and accompanying text.
33.
WILLIAM A. ScHABAs, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE 278-83 (2010) (discussing the variety of
proposals formally introduced and the expressions of support from, inter alia, Poland,
Australia, Canada, Mexico, Khazakstan, Senegal, and Afghanistan and concluding that
a "clear majority of States preferred an option based upon universal jurisdiction"); see
also Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of
National Courts and InternationalTribunals, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 383, 417-28 (1998)
[hereinafter Brown, Primacy or Complementarity] (describing the advantages and
disadvantages of such an inherent supranational scheme).
34.
See David J. Scheffer, International Operations of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, S. Hrg. 105-724, at 13 (July 23, 1998) (testimony of Ambassadorat-Large for War Crimes Issues and Head of the U.S. Delegation for the UN Diplomatic
Conference on the Establishment of a Permanent International Criminal Court, U.S.
Department of State) (reproducing the statement of Ambassador Scheffer in which he
referred to a regime of "automatic jurisdiction over the crime of genocide" in describing
the inherent regime of the ILC Draft); see also Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. VI, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, entered
into force Jan 12, 1951 [hereinafter Genocide Convention] (providing that persons
charged with genocide "shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the
territory in which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as
may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have
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included a provision that allowed the ICC to have automatic
jurisdiction over the crime of genocide, which would have created a
truly concurrent jurisdiction, at least over those offenses. 3 5 Unlike
the ad hoc tribunals that are grounded in the Chapter VII authority
of the United Nations Security Council, 36 a system built on
straightforward assertions of supranational primacy was not a
"politically viable alternative for a permanent ICC."'3 7 Similarly,
proposals by Germany and Korea for an extended supranational
jurisdiction based on the universality principle were emphatically
rejected by delegations in Rome. 38 Some scholars lament the fact that
the "underlying disparity of wealth, power, and influence" resulted in
a multilateral treaty that "was heavily influenced by the prevailing
notions of state sovereignty and the views of the most powerful
states." 3 9 Such is the nature of any multilateral negotiating dynamic,

which inevitably produces what some states or treaty supporters see
as suboptimal outcomes. The key issue for the purposes of pinpointing
the precise basis of ICC jurisdiction on the territory of a State Party
is that the Statute as adopted is founded on the bedrock of state
consent.
Rather than a flawed system

of concurrent

jurisdiction, the

existing jurisdictional scheme requires progressive judicial findings
accepted its jurisdiction"). In the 1948 debates over the Genocide Convention, the
United States actually made a proposal that sounded remarkably close to the modern
formulation of complementarity in the ICC context. The proposal would have added an
additional paragraph to Article VII of the Genocide Convention to read as follows:
"Assumption of jurisdiction by the international tribunal shall be subject to a finding
that the State in which the crime was committed has failed to take adequate measures
to punish the crime." Rep. of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, U.N. Doc. E1794
(1948), reprinted in U.N. Secretary General, Historical Survey of the Question of
InternationalCriminal Jurisdiction142, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/7Rev.1 (1949). The proposal
was rejected by a vote of five votes to one with one abstention (the USSR) on the basis
that such a paragraph would prejudice the question of the court's jurisdiction. Id.
35.
Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, U.N.
GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, art 21(1)(a), 25(1), U.N. Doc AJ49/10 (1994)
[hereinafter ILC Draft Statute].
The innovative use of the Security Council Chapter VII authority to
36.
establish the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals was so widely accepted by 1998 that
the correlative provision in the Rome Statute that permits precisely the same extension
of ICC jurisdiction even over the nationals and territory of non-States Parties was
uncontroversial. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 13(b); infra notes 113-30.
37.
Brown, Primacy or Complementarity, supra note 33, at 431.
38.
See Sharon A. Williams & William A. Schabas, Article 12, in COMMENTARY
ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERs' NOTES
ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 547, 550-56 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d. ed. 2008) (describing the
content and consequential politics of the German, Korean, British, and American
proposals); see also Andreas Zimmermann, The Creationof a Permanent International
Criminal Court, in 2 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 169, at 205ff
(1998) (detailing the legal underpinnings of the then German proposal for such a
universal jurisdiction-based Court).
Richard Dicker, The International Criminal Court (ICC) and Double
39.
Standards of Justice, in THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 3, 6 (Carsten Stahn ed., 2015).
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that implement an appropriate balance of authority between the
supranational court and domestic states. Supranational jurisdiction
based on a straightforward scheme of concurrent jurisdiction would
almost certainly have resulted in ever-present jurisdictional clashes
between the ICC and one or more states with valid claims based on
established principles such as nationality, territoriality, or passive
personality. 40 In order to ensure the preservation of individual state
sovereignty and fulfill the promises of complementarity, the Rome
Statute contains specific restraints on the exercise of the Court's
power.
Article 12 sets out the preconditions for exercise of the Court's
jurisdiction. This is important because the OTP cannot initiate an
investigation without first certifying that the "information available
to the Prosecutor provides a reasonable basis to believe that a crime
'41
within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed.
Similarly, the Pre-Trial Chamber cannot issue a Warrant of Arrest
without deciding on the jurisdictional sufficiency of the charges over
the alleged perpetrator at the time of the charged offenses. 4 2 Article
19 of the Statute mandates that the Court satisfy itself that it has
jurisdictional competency "in any case brought before it" and sets
forth the range of parties that may contest jurisdiction. 4 3 The textual
distinction between an overall "situation" and a specific "case"
brought against a particular perpetrator is important because the
scope of Court jurisdiction over particular perpetrators within a given
situation is never monolithic and all encompassing.
The practical effects of Article 12 are significant as they embody
the theory that the Court should not have jurisdiction where States
involved have not so consented. On its face, Article 12 preserves the
principle that ICC jurisdiction is grounded in the sovereign consent of
states. 4 4 The preconditions under Article 12 serve as a limitation on
the Court's power; at a minimum, one State that would normally be
able to exercise jurisdiction over the case will have manifested
consent to the jurisdiction of the Court. Should all States involved in
a conflict refuse to consent to the power of the Court, then the
conditions of Article 12 have not been met, and the ICC is powerless
to hear the case in the absence of a Security Council referral of the

40.

See M. Cherif Bassiouni & Christopher L. Blakesly, The Need for an

International Criminal Court in the New International World Order, 25 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 151, 170 (1992) ("The problem with concurrent jurisdiction, however, is
that it inherently includes the potential for jurisdictional conflict between two or more
states and the international criminal court.").
41.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 53(1).
42.
Id. art. 58(1).
43.
Id. art. 19.
44.
Article 12 works in conjunction with the admissibility criteria of Article 17
to preserve state jurisdictional primacy. See infra notes 54-78 and accompanying text.
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overall situation using its Chapter VII authority derived from the UN
Charter.
The jurisdictional provisions of Article 12 were a make-or-break
gamble that represented the most controversial aspect of the Rome
Statute. 4 5 Its final form emerged as a take-it-or-leave-it "package"
that had been cobbled together behind closed doors by the conference
Bureau and completed at 2:00 am of the last day of the conference,
Friday, July 17, 1998. The Rome Statute as adopted postulated
solutions to some drafting questions that delegates had been unable
to resolve and included a number of provisions that the Bureau
selected and presented to the floor without open debate on either the
text itself or its substantive merits. 4 6 Article 12 requires only that
"one or more" States have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court. This
distinction is important because treaties do not "create either
obligations or rights for a third State without its consent. '4 7 Rather
than violating the framework of international law, as some scholars
argued at the time, 48 Article 12 reflects the reality that states possess
an inherent right of territorial jurisdiction that they may dispose of in
accordance with their sovereign prerogatives. In effect, if nationals of
a state that is not a party to the treaty commit crimes on the territory
of a State Party, then that state has agreed a priori that the ICC can
exercise its jurisdiction as an extension of the uncontroverted right of
the territorial state to punish all persons who have committed crimes
on its soil, regardless of their nationality.
The vital point, particularly regarding the putative transfers
from Afghanistan and Palestine to the ICC discussed below, is that
the State Party must itself possess jurisdictional authority at the
time of the alleged offense. Otherwise, there is no tangible right that
can result in jurisdiction under Article 12. This concept, that I term
"transferred territoriality," was a distinctive innovation. In effect,

45.
See David J. Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal
Court, 93 AM. J. INV'L L. 12, 17-21 (1999).
46.
See Michael A. Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic
JurisdictionConsistent with the Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court, 167
MIL. L. REV. 20, 21 (2001) (discussing the Rome Statute as a quietly put together takeit-or-leave-it package).
47.
VCLT, supra note 24, art. 34.
48.
See Madeleine Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and NonParty States, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 27 (2001). The U.S. Department of
Defense Law of War Manual echoes this inaccurate legal conclusion conception by
restating that "the United States has a longstanding and continuing objection to any
assertion of jurisdiction by the ICC with respect to nationals of States not Party to the
Rome Statute in the absence of consent from such States or a referral by the Security
Council." OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
LAW OF WAR MANUAL 1110, 18.20.3.1 (2015) [hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL].
But see Dapo Akande, The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over
Nationals of Non-Party States: Legal Basis and Limits, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 618
(2003).
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transferred territoriality created a legal superstructure over the
aspirational seeds sown in Article 6 of the 1949 Genocide
Convention. 49 The concept of transferred territoriality was
sufficiently accepted that a U.S. proposal that would have required an
affirmative manifestation of consent before the ICC could exercise
any personal jurisdiction over nationals of a non-Party State was
defeated by a no-action motion adopted 113 in favor, 17 opposed, with
25 abstentions. 50 States sought to assuage American fears by
observing that the concept of complementarity described in the next
subsection "best describes the nature of the International Criminal
Court."5 1 Delegates noted that deference to domestic jurisdictions of
non-States Parties would be required by the conjunction of Articles 17
(the complementarity framework) and 98 (which sought to preserve
the legal validity of jurisdictional Status of Forces Agreements
between the United States and more than one hundred other
nations). Such bland assurances were unwarranted, as present events
have demonstrated.
2. The Admissibility Framework
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was
designed to address the "most serious crimes of international
concern." 52 This mandate operates against the griindnorm that the
Court at all times and in all cases "shall be complementary to
national criminal jurisdictions." 5 3 The paradigmatic language of
Article 17(1) sets out what is technically termed "issues of
admissibility." 54 The article declares in full that:
Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall
determine that a case is inadmissible where:
(a)
The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry
out the investigation or prosecution;
(b)
The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it
and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the

See Genocide Convention, supra note 34, art. VI ("Persons charged with
49.
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be tried by a competent
tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such
international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting
Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.").
50.
Williams & Schabas, supra note 38, at 555.
51.
Silvia A. Fernandez, Foreword to I THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
AND

COMPLEMENTARITY:

Mohammed
52.
53.
54.

FROM THEORY TO PRACTIcE, at xviii (Carsten Stahn &

M. El Zeidy eds., 2011).
See Rome Statute, supranote 1, art. 1.
Id.
Id. art. 17.
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decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to
prosecute;
(c)
The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the
subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under article
20, paragraph 3;
(d)
Court.

The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the
55

The operative language in Article 17 mandates that "the Court
shall determine that a case is inadmissible" where the criteria
warranting exclusive domestic authority are met as specified in the
Statute itself.5 6 The formulation that a case is "inadmissible" unless
the domestic state is "unwilling or unable genuinely" to carry out the
investigation or prosecution is technically termed the admissibility
criterion, but is almost universally referred to using the legal term of
art "complementarity." 5 7 The admissibility requirements are
important in part because they were so carefully negotiated by states
in order to preserve the primacy of domestic jurisdictions, but they
also represent some of the Court's most important pragmatic
constraints by focusing its scarce resources on the cases where its role
is most beneficial.
Though it is the fulcrum that prioritizes the authority of
domestic forums, the precept of complementarity embedded in the
Rome Statute does not of itself logically lead to a homogenized system
of national and supranational concurrent jurisdiction despite its
simple formulation. Complementarity is designed to serve as a
pragmatic and limiting principle rather than an affirmative means
for an aggressive prosecutor to target the nationals of states that are
hesitant to embrace ICC jurisdiction and authority. The provisions of
the Rome Statute preserve a careful balance between maintaining the
integrity of domestic adjudications and authorizing a supranational
court to exercise power where domestic systems are inadequate.
Complementarity preserves this delicate balance by serving as a
restrictive principle rather than an empowering one; while the ICC
has affirmative powers as a supranational court, the textual
predicates necessary to make a case admissible are designed to
constrain the power of the Court.

55.
56.
57.

Id. art. 17(1).
Id.
See, e.g., Michael A. Newton, The Quest for Constructive Complementarity,

in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY: FROM THEORY TO

PRACTICE 304, 314 (Carsten Stahn & Mohammed El Zeidy eds., 2011); William W.
Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and
National Courts in the Rome System of InternationalJustice, 49 HARVARD. INT. L.J. 53,
53 (2008).
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Complementarity has been repeatedly reaffirmed as the most
suitable formulation for interactions of an international adjudicatory
institution with fully empowered domestic systems. John Holmes, a
Canadian diplomat who was deeply involved in the negotiations that
preceded the Rome Statute, noted that
Throughout the negotiating process, States made clear that the most effective
and viable system to bring perpetrators of serious crimes to justice was one
which must be based on national procedures complemented by an international
court .

.

. The success in Rome is due in no small measure to the delicate

balance developed for the complementarity regime ... [i]t remains clear to
those most active throughout the negotiations that any shift in the balance
struck in Rome would likely have unravelled [sic] support for the principle of
complementarity and, by extension, the Statute itself. 58

The complementarity principle was the motivating force behind a
court built around a limited and defined scope of jurisdiction that
operates only when needed to supplement domestic court systems.
The initial limiting function of complementarity derives from the
treaty basis of the ICC. As a fundamental premise of treaty law,
States should be bound to a treaty only by voluntarily relinquishing
part of their sovereign rights manifested through the signing and
implementation of the treaty into domestic systems. 59 As a logical
extension, States Parties delegate decision-making authority over
proposed amendments to the Rome Statute to the ASP. 60 In other
words, States Parties ceded some degree of future sovereign
prerogative to the Court in the confidence that the constraints of the
text were dispositive. States that elected not to ratify the Rome
Statute have ceded none of their sovereign rights to the Court or its
constituent organs.
Complementarity generated much debate over the best method
for constraining the power of a potentially overreaching prosecutor.
This was particularly important because the inherently subjective
framework of Article 17 applies equally to all states. To that end,
paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 17 attempt to provide specific factors
the Court shall consider in evaluating the effort of the domestic
jurisdiction with respect to its unwillingness or inability to
investigate or prosecute. 6 1 The factors enumerated for determining if
a State is unwilling to prosecute include whether the proceedings

58.
John T. Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity, in THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS,

RESULTS 41, 73-74 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999).
59.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 12, 14, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 980, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679. This foundational truth is echoed in the
provisions that a treaty does not create obligations for a third state without its consent.
Id. art 34.
60.
See Rome Statute, supranote 1, arts. 121-22.
61.
Id. art. 17(2)-(3).
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were undertaken for the purpose of shielding the person concerned
from criminal responsibility, 62 whether there was an unjustified
delay in the proceedings, 6 3 or whether the proceedings were not being
conducted independently or impartially. 64 The determination of the
inability of a domestic court to adjudicate the case is "whether due to
a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial
system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary
evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its
65
proceedings."
In sharp contrast, the requirement "genuinely" in the
formulation of Article 17, paragraph 1 is left for the Court to
ascertain. This gap caused one of the most distinguished
international scholars in the field to observe that this aspect of
Article 17 is "enigmatic." 66 Accepting the reality that some external
standard of review was needed to prevent illusory efforts by states,
delegates rejected a series of proposed phrases such as "ineffective,"
"diligently," "apparently well founded," "good faith," "sufficient
grounds," and "effectively" on the basis that such formulations
remained overly subjective. 6 7 In the final analysis, the formulation
"genuinely" was accepted by delegations as being the least subjective
concept considered, while at the same time eliminating external
considerations of domestic efficiency in the investigation or
prosecution. 68 For the purposes of this Article, the essential
conclusion is that the Rome Statute's very design contemplates the
need for systematic cooperation between jurisdictions rather than
capture by the supranational court.
The admissibility requirements, unlike the jurisdictional
predicates, do not speak to the Court's power to hear a case. They
serve as a mechanism to give State jurisdictions primacy because the
supranational authority is the exception rather than the de fault
norm. The prohibition on ICC authority in Article 17 results in a
terminological shift by which the concept of complementarity is
embedded into treaty provisions that articulate the considerations
and criteria for the admissibility of a particular case. Domestic states
have valid claims to jurisdiction without the possibility of ICC

62.
Id. art. 17(2)(a).
63.
Id. art. 17(2)(b).
Id. art. 17(2)(c).
64.
Id. art. 17(3).
65.
66.
WILLIAM SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 67 (2001).
67.
Rod Jensen, Complementarity, "Genuinely" and Article 17: Assessing the
Boundaries of an Effective ICC, in COMPLEMENTARY VIEWS ON COMPLEMENTARITY 147,
155 (Jann K. Kleffner & Gerben Kor eds., 2006).
68.
John Holmes, Complementarity: National Courts Versus the ICC, in THE
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY (A. Cassesse
et. al eds., 1st ed. 2001).
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interference, whether or not they are members of the ASP. The
carefully constructed textual balance between domestic and
international power masks the complexity of the underlying debates
over the appropriate resolution between the multilateral treaty and
the underlying web of preexisting agreements. In fact, the former
President of the Court, Judge Phillipe Kirsch, publicly acknowledged
that the ICC "will really have to invent, create, and define the
meaning of a state that is unable or unwilling to conduct genuine
69
proceedings."
ICC Judgements promulgating an automatic presumption of
universal jurisdiction that overrides other applicable treaty-based
jurisdiction would change the central character of the Rome Statute.
A permanent shift to a judicially approved policy of automatic
supranational jurisdiction at the expense of treaty-based domestic
jurisdiction over the same types of offenses would represent an
abandonment of the shared responsibility of states and the Court to
seek justice.
3. The Intent of Article 98
As shown in the preceding subsections, the ICC was designed
from the ground up to be additive to sovereign jurisdictions. Seeking
to preserve sovereign prosecutorial prerogatives, U.S. negotiators
decided as early as 1994 that the new Court could not eviscerate
71
bilateral and multilateral 70 Status of Forces agreements (SOFAs)

69.
Phillipe Kirsch, President, Int'l Criminal Court, The International
Criminal Court, remarks John Tait Memorial Lecture in Law and Policy (Oct. 7, 2003),

cited in Gregory S. McNeal, ICC Inability Determinationsin Light of the Dujail Case,
39 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 325, 325 (2007).
70.
The text as adopted leaves lacuna with respect to the jurisdictional
immunities that attach to personnel deployed pursuant to multinational agreements
negotiated by international organizations such as the Military Technical Annex
concluded in 2002 between the British military commander and Afghanistan to cover
NATO forces inside the country. GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPS, THE PROSECUTION
AND DEFENSE OF PEACEKEEPERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 245-247

(2004); see also U.N. Secretary-General, Model Agreement Between the United Nations
and Member States Contributing Personnel and Equipment to United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations,art. IV, U.N. Doc. A/46/185 (May 23, 1991); U.N. Secretary-

General, Model Status of Forces Agreement for Peace-Keeping Operations, 1 47(b), U.N.
47(b) that members of the military
Doc. A/45/594 (Oct. 9, 1990) (providing in
component "shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective sending
states in respect of any criminal offenses that may be committed by them" on the
territory of the host nation).
71.
U.S. Department of Defense doctrine defines this term as follows: "statusof-forces agreement-a bilateral or multilateral agreement that defines the legal
position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state." DEP'T
OF DEFENSE, JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF
MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 229 (8 November 2010, as Amended Through 15
June 2015), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/newjpubs/jpl-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/P82RFXXE] (archived Feb. 18, 2016). Other academics have adopted a more legalistic
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by which the authority of American military and federal courts are
safeguarded from interference by domestic courts in more than one
hundred nations. 7 2 This became a "rock bottom" negotiating stance
that was embraced by all of the delegations in Rome and incorporated
into Article 98 of the Statute. 73 Thus, if nothing else, the Rome
Statute stands for the proposition that accountability for the array of
crimes detailed in Articles 6, 7, 8, and 8bis of the treaty must impinge
upon sovereignty to some degree, but not at the expense of erasing
the traditional jurisdictional arrangements between states.
Reflecting the early and strong consensus on its substance, the
final text of Article 98 of the Rome Statute is identical to the proposed
Draft Article submitted to the Committee of the Whole. 74 This
example of a completely unmodified text in the wake of lengthy and
contentious negotiations will strike any experienced treaty negotiator
as very rare indeed. Article 98(2) 75 of the Statute provides that the

ICC
may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the
requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international
agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to

approach focusing on the binding nature of SOFAs as treaties-"A SOFA is an
arrangement, no matter in what form, delineating the legal status of servicemen from a
sending State who stay with the consent of the host State on its territory, and that at
the least includes rules on the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over the sending State's
servicemen." JOOP VOETELINK, STATUS OF FORCES: CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER
MILITARY PERSONNEL ABROAD 1.4.6, 17 (Marielle Matthee trans., 2015).
See DAVID J. SCHEFFER, ALL THE MISSING SOULS 171 (2012).
72.
73.
See id. at 175.
74.
Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Report of the Drafting
Committee, 15 June-17 July 1998, U.N. Doc. AICONF.183/13, 177-78, reprinted in III
United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
Rome (Vol. III)
(1998),
http://legal.un.orgl
International
Criminal Court
diplomaticconferences/icc- 1998/volenglish/volIII_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2C6-5LE5]
(archived Feb. 5, 2016); see also M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, II THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: AN ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE EVOLUTION OF THE
STATUTE 703-04 (2005).
At the time of this writing, the application of Article 98(1) addressing the
75.
residual diplomatic immunities owed to non-States Parties remains a hotly contested
jurisprudential issue because it has surfaced in the context of the transfer of Omar
Bashir to the authority of the Court. See Paola Gaeta, Does President Al Bashir Enjoy
Immunity From Arrest?, 7 J. INT. CRIM. J. 315, 316 (2009); Prosecutor v. Bashir, ICC02/05-01/09, Decision Following the Prosecutor's Request for an Order Further
Clarifying that the Republic of South Africa Is Under the Obligation to Immediately
6 (June 13, 2015), http://www.iccArrest and Surrender Omar Al Bashir,
cpi.inticcdocs/doc/doc1995566.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7HF-HFQC] (archived Feb. 18,
2016); Prosecutor v. Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-195, Decision on the Cooperation of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo Regarding Omar Al Bashir's Arrest and Surrender to
the Court,
28-31 (Apr 9, 2014), http://www.legal-tools.org/en/doc/89d30d
[https://perma.cc/AT8Q-YH3Q] (archived Feb. 18, 2016); The South Africa Litigation
21 (High Court of
Centre v. the Minister of Justice, et. al., Case No. 27740/2015,
South Africa) (Gauteng Division, Pretorial) (June 23, 2015), http://constitutionally
speaking.co.za/complete-high-court-al-bashir-judgment/ [https://perma.cc/T47U-UFYD]
(archived Feb. 18, 2016).
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surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain
the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the
surrender.

76

The text itself is rather straightforward. It absorbed little
negotiation time in Rome because it "was not considered to be of
utmost political sensitivity by most participants
in the
negotiations." 7 7 One of the most eminent experts assessing the Rome
Statute noted that the travaux prdparatoires for Article 98 are
"summary and uninformative."78 On its face, Article 98(2) addresses
only agreements between states, whether they are bilateral or
multilateral. Neither does the text provide any express or implied
limitation on the timing of such an agreement when measured
against the accession of any state into the ASP. The universal
understanding is that the use of the term "sending state" in contrast
to the receiving state reflects the clear sense of negotiators that its
principal area of application is to Status of Forces Agreements. 79 The
United States made that connection clear from the beginning of the
negotiations in 1995.80
The head of the U.S. delegation addressed the Ad Hoc
Committee in 1995 with the admonition that "[i]t is also critical that
the rights and responsibilities of states parties to applicable Status of
Forces Agreements be fully preserved under the statute of the
ICC .... Most SOFAs contain provisions governing the exercise of

criminal jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed or posted
abroad. ' 8 1 Most delegations understood the U.S. argument and
"accepted without difficulty that status of forces agreements created a
kind of immunity over nationals of a sending state who were on the
territory of another nation analogous to diplomats which would be
entitled to some recognition in the Statute."82 In any event, the text
is devoid of practical consequences for States Parties because Article
98(1), dealing with diplomatic or other immunities, is waived by

76.
77.

Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 98(2).
Claus Krep & Kimberly Prost, Article 98, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME

STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES ARTICLE BY

ARTICLE 1601, 1604 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d. ed. 2008) (describing the content and
consequential politics that surrounded Article 98 after its uncontroversial adoption).
78.
SCHABAS, supra note 33, at 1042.
79.

BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL

JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL COURT: BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 148, 167, 180 (2003).
80.
See David J. Scheffer, Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute: America's Original
Intent, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 333, 339 (2005) ('Che use of the term 'sending State'
derives from the original American effort, very early in the ICC negotiations, to
preserve the rights accorded to its official personnel covered by status of forces
agreements (SOFAs) between the United States and scores of foreign governments.").
81.
SCHABAS, supra note 33, at 1042.
82.
Id. at 1043.
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virtue of Article 27(2).83 Requests from the Court to States Parties
would bypass Article 98(2) due to the generalized duty to cooperate
in the Statute 84 and the particularized duty to "comply with requests
for arrest and surrender" of alleged perpetrators subject to the
85
procedures under their national law.
In sum, Article 98, when taken at face value, merely recognizes a
limited right of non-surrender for citizens of non-States Parties. Its
provisions nevertheless generated a storm of controversy as the
George W. Bush administration began a worldwide campaign on May
6, 2002, to negotiate a web of bilateral agreements to insulate U.S.
service members from transfer to the Court.8 6 Commentators referred
to these as "bilateral immunity agreements" or "bilateral impunity
agreements" but overlooked the fact that the U.S. agreements purport
only to create a reciprocal duty between nations not to transfer each
other's citizens pursuant to a request from the Court (which in most
agreements includes the obligation to refrain from transfer to another
state for the purpose of eventual transfer to the Court "for any
purpose"). Absent the pejorative presumption from ICC proponents
that the Article 98 agreements are undesirable as a feature of ICC
practice, there is nothing on the face of the bilateral agreements that
hints at presumed or promised immunity from prosecution for
substantive offenses found in the Rome Statute.
Beginning the campaign that would eventually negotiate more
than one hundred such agreements, 8 7 the Undersecretary of State for

83.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 27(2) ("Immunities or special procedural
rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or
international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a
person.").
84.
Id. art. 86 (General Obligation to Cooperate: "States Parties shall, in
accordance with the provisions of this Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in its
investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.").
85.
Id. art. 89.
86.
On that day, the State Department notified the Secretary General that
despite President Clinton's signature the United States did not intend to ratify the
treaty. Secretary of State Colin Powell simultaneously sent a demarche to every U.S.
Ambassador to raise the issue with the host nation as follows, 'We are interested in
your view regarding bilateral agreements recognized under Article 98 of the Rome
Statute that could be used to provide protection for nationals from both of our countries
from the reach of the ICC. If a host government offers directly to undertake such an
agreement, post can use the following point: We would be interested in discussing your
offer further at the moment we are considering our next steps and should have a
decision very soon. I will report our conversation to Washington and I expect we will
have a response for you shortly." Colin Powell, Sec'y of State, Demarche on the U.S.
Policy on the International Criminal Court from Secretary to Ambassadors 5 (May 2,
2006), http://www.amicc.org/docs/DemarcheUS.pdf [perma.cc/ZPG4-4JKW] (archived
Feb. 7, 2016).
87.
For an updated listing and the text of the existing unclassified bilateral
agreements, see Georgetown, International Criminal Court-Article 98 Research
Guide, GEORGETOWN LAW LIBRARY, https://www.law.georgetown.eduflibrary/research/
guides/article_98.cfm [perma.cc/75X8-YNZS] (archived Feb. 7, 2016).
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Policy reassured the world that "the United States respects the
decision of those nations who have chosen to join the ICC; but they in
turn must respect our decision not to join the ICC or place our
citizens under the jurisdiction of the Court. '8 8 U.S policy continued to
emphasize mutual efforts to "promote real justice." In particular, the
United States promised, inter alia, to "continue our longstanding role
as an advocate for the principle that there must be accountability for
war crimes and other serious violations of international
89
humanitarian law" and to "discipline our own when appropriate."
Implicitly referencing the concerns of ICC supporters regarding this
campaign, Professor William Schabas concluded that the "legal
consequences"
of Article
98(2)
agreements
"were
much
misunderstood" as they in no way sought to achieve immunity from
investigation and prosecution where appropriate. His definitive
Commentary noted that Article 98 agreements "do not affect the
jurisdiction of the Court at all."90
The actual substance of the worldwide web of bilateral
agreements in place at the time of this writing has little to do with
jurisdictional conflicts caused by equally binding treaty obligations,
as even a cursory reading of Article 98 and the agreements makes
plain. However, the practice following the Rome Conference
illustrates two powerful, but subtle, linkages between the debates
over Article 98 and the present jurisdictional dilemmas faced by the
Court. Firstly, the text itself sets up a powerful duality in that it
preserves the ability of States Parties to transfer jurisdiction to the
Court as an aspect of sovereign prerogative. The concept of
transferred territoriality is buttressed by the duty of any State Party
to cooperate with the Court, but only within the limits of lawful
capacity
as governed
by "obligations under international
91
agreements."
At the same time, the validity of the underlying
bilateral obligations is implicitly preserved. In fact, Article 98(2)
represents a definitive rejection of the argument by some ICC
advocates that the object and purpose of the Rome Statute is to
establish the authority of the supranational court as the transcendent
institution empowered to bypass any hindrance to its punitive
discretion. Of particular note, there is nothing in the Statute or in
subsequent state practice that distinguishes between a SOFA
presumed valid only for the purposes of transfers under Article 98
and one that addresses transfers as well as the allocation of

88.
Marc Grossman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Remarks to the
Center for Strategic and International Studies Washington DC, American Foreign
Policy and the InternationalCriminalCourt 5, May 6, 2002, http://www.amicc.org/docs/
Grossman_5_6_02.pdf [https:/Hperma.c/ZZB7-QNV8] (archived Feb. 7, 2016).
89.
Id.
90.
SCHABAS, supra note 33, at 1045.
91.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 98(2).
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jurisdiction between sovereigns. In fact, as the next section will
demonstrate, most SOFAs combine jurisdictional allocation between
States on the horizontal level along with a wide range of other issues.
The broad phrase "international agreements" in Article 98
encompasses a wide array of SOFA arrangements to include those
that allot jurisdictional authority even when one of the parties to the
bilateral instrument subsequently accedes to the Rome Statute.
Secondly, to buttress this conclusion, the American campaign to
achieve Article 98 Agreements generated intensive debate within the
European Union, which in turn reinforced the binding nature of
SOFA Agreements even as States Parties assumed new treaty-based
duties under the Rome Statute. On September 30, 2002, the Council
of the European Union issued its Conclusions and Guiding Principles
concerning arrangements between the United States and States
Parties regarding the surrender of persons to ICC authority. The
European Union supported the concept of such agreements subject to
three conditions: (1) that EU states take "existing international
agreements" into account (presumably referring to the NATO Status
of Forces Agreement that creates concurrent jurisdiction for most
offenses), 9 2 (2) they should cover only persons sent in their official
capacity to another territory by a non-State Party, and (3) "any
solution should include appropriate operative provisions ensuring
that persons who have committed crimes falling within the
93
jurisdiction of the Court do not enjoy impunity."
The EU policy guidance implicitly accepted the legality of an
allocation of jurisdiction and investigative authority from a State
Party to a non-State Party when the relevant international
agreements "ensure appropriate investigation and-where there is
sufficient evidence-prosecution by national jurisdictions concerning
persons requested by the ICC."' 94 Thus, subsequent state practice
within the European Union is clear that international agreements
that allocate jurisdiction between sovereigns remain legally binding
even after entry into force of the Rome Statute. Notwithstanding the
text of Articles 12 and 98, jurisdictional allocations between states
are subject only to the limitation that the "object and purpose of the

Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
92.
Regarding the Status of their Forces art VII.3, 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846, (June
19, 1951) [hereinafter NATO Agreement], http://www.nato.int/cps/enlnatohq/officialtexts_17265.htm [perma.cc/9WVR-PC67] (archived Feb. 7, 2016).
Council Conclusions on the International Criminal Court ICC34EN (Sept.
93.
30, 2002), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUploadIICC34EN.pdf [perma.cc/
3K9A-Q8UC] (archived Feb. 7, 2016).
Id.; see also James Crawford, Phillippe Sands & Ralph Wild, Joint
94.
Opinion, In the Matter of the Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court and in the
Matter of Bilateral Agreements Sought by the United States Under Article 98(2) of the
47-52 (June 5, 2003), http://www.amicc.org/docs/Art98-14uneO3FINAL.pdf
Statute,
[perma.cc/H2TB-ZNPW] (archived Feb. 7, 2016).
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ICC Statute precludes a State party from entering into an agreement
the purpose or effect of which may lead to impunity. '9 5 The following
section will examine the binding agreements entered into by
Afghanistan and the PA that now present the Court with highly
controversial and superficially conflicting treaty obligations vis-a-vis
the ICC.
B. The Pattern of PreexistingJurisdictionalAllocations
The Rome Statute is expressly designed to be juxtaposed against
an array of other treaty obligations incumbent on States Parties. The
jurisdictional provisions of the Geneva Conventions, 9 6 for example,
remain fully applicable. SOFAs remain a ubiquitous feature of
modern military operations for both ICC States Parties and nonStates Parties. They continue to be indispensable to United Nations
peacekeeping efforts. 97 Most such agreements address ancillary
matters such as customs constraints, wearing of uniforms, and the
right of sending state nationals to carry weapons.
But the key provisions of any SOFA are those that address the
legal protection from domestic prosecution that will be afforded to the
nationals of the negotiating state present in a foreign country. 98
Department of Defense Directive 5525.1, for example, specifies that
U.S. policy is "to protect, to the maximum extent possible, the rights
of U.S. personnel who may be subject to criminal trial by foreign
courts and imprisonment in foreign prisons." 99 Typical SOFA

95.
Crawford, Sands & Wild, supra note 94, 1 52.
96.
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field arts. 1-11, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (replacing Hague Convention No. X of 18 October 1907, 36 Stat.
2371); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 1, Aug.12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (replacing the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Prisoners of War of 27 July 1929, 47 Stat. 2021); Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims Of International Armed
Conflicts art. 1.1, June 8, 1977, 125 U.N.T.S. 3.
97.
See, e.g., The Status of Forces Agreement Between the United Nations and
the Government of the Republic of South Sudan Concerning the United Nations
Mission in South Sudan, August 8, 2011, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/
unmiss/documents/unmisssofa_0808201l.pdf [perma.cc/5QZX-CQGF] (archived Feb.
7, 2016).
98.
See, e.g., CHUCK MASON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34531, STATUS OF
FORCES AGREEMENT (SOFA): WHAT IS IT, AND How HAS IT BEEN UTILIZED? 5 (2012).
99.
Department of Defense, DoDD 5525.1, Status of Forces Policy and
Information,
3 (Aug. 7, 1979), http://www.dtic.mi]/whs/directives/corres/pdf/
552501p.pdf [perma.cc/GK5V-3KT8] (archived Feb. 7, 2016). The NATO SOFA
guarantees arrested members of the Armed Forces and their civilian dependents, inter
alia, an attorney, an interpreter, and a prompt and speedy trial, as well as the right to
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provisions establish which party to the agreement is able to assert
criminal and/or civil jurisdiction and specify procedures for the
exercise of civil and criminal jurisdiction by the host nation over
personnel of the sending state if at all. Military prosecutors would
vehemently object to unsupported assumptions that treaty provisions
related to jurisdictional immunity from foreign prosecution serve as
the functional equivalent of grants of impunity for war crimes; they
merely preserve the full panoply of prosecutorial prerogatives to the
sending state. Both States Parties10 0 and non-States Parties10 1 have
convened many war crimes prosecutions in recent years based on
jurisdictional authorities of domestic law and SOFA provisions that
confront witnesses, obtain favorable witnesses, and communicate with a representative
of the United States. NATO Agreement, supra note 92, art. VII, 9.
100.
See generally R.v. Sec'y of State for Def., (2007) 3 W.L.R. 33 (H.L.)
(documenting a situation in which British soldiers were accused of committing war
crimes and the case was brought to the attention of the ICC prosecutor; the UK
stepped in and prosecuted the soldiers, which they were able to do since they had the
proper domestic legislation; subsequently, the ICC prosecutor found the prosecution
sufficient and did not try the soldiers under the ICC); MICHAEL A. NEWTON & LARRY
MAY, PROPORTIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 194-99 (2014) (discussing the
investigation and ultimate acquittal of Polish forces for crimes alleged near a village
called Nangar Khel, located in the Paktika province of Afghanistan; the case
represents the danger of conflating the principles of distinction and proportionality and
the common understanding on this issue of ICC States Parties such as Poland,
Germany, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, among others).
See, e.g., U.S. v. Bram, No. ARMY 20111032, 2014 WL 7236126 (Army Ct.
101.
Crim. App. Nov. 20, 2014) (convicting appellant of solicitation to commit murder in
Afghanistan, sentencing appellant to a dishonorable discharge, confinement for five
years, and reduction from the grade of E-5 to the grade of E-l, and subsequently
denying appeal because there was no doubt that "this was anything but a criminal
venture well outside the bounds of the rules of engagement or law of armed conflict");
U.S. v. Morlock, No. ARMY 20110230, 2014 WL 7227382 (Army Ct. Crim. App. Apr. 30,
2014) (upholding conviction of attempted murder for an agreement between appellant
and other soldiers from his unit, while deployed to Afghanistan, to murder non-hostile
Afghan males through the use of grenades and automatic weapons and then claim
their victims had either committed a hostile act or exhibited hostile intent); United
States v. Behenna, 71 M.J. 228, 229 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (resulting in a sentence of
Dismissal from the service, twenty-five years confinement, forfeiture of all pay and
allowances on charges of unpremeditated murder and assault); United States v.
Girouard, 70 M.J. 5, 7 (C.A.A.F. 2011); United States v. Maynulet, 68 M.J. 374, 377
(C.A.A.F. 2011); United States v. Clagett, No. ARMY20070082, 2009 WL 6843560, at
*1 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2009); United States v. Green, 654 F.3d 637, 646-47 (6th Cir.
2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1056 (2012) (Green was convicted and sentenced to life in
prison for participating in a sexual assault and multiple murders while stationed in
Iraq as an infantryman in the United States Army. Green was discharged due to a
personality disorder before senior Army officials became aware that he and three fellow
soldiers were involved in these crimes. He was convicted in federal court and the three
coconspirators were tried by courts-martial and each sentenced to between 90 and 110
years imprisonment); Kevin Vaughan, Soldier Pleads Guilty to Killing Jailed Taliban
Commander, DENVER POST (May 26, 2011), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_18142186
[https://perma.cc/EA2A-79GZ] (archived Mar. 1, 2016) (chronicling the story of a soldier
sentenced to life in prison, which was limited to a term of no more than twelve and a
half years through an agreement between the Army and the soldier's lawyers, and who
was dishonorably discharged, and had rank reduced to E-1 after soldier pleaded guilty
to premeditated murder of a detainee committed during deployment in Afghanistan).
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preservc in personam jurisdiction that might otherwise have been
exercised by the territorial state. Such domestic prosecutions are fully
consistent with the object and purpose of the Rome Statute as well as
its plain text.
The sovereign act of a State Party in transferring its own
territorial jurisdiction over the nationals of another state to the Court
is perfectly consistent with the VCLT if the territorial state has a
colorable claim to jurisdiction at the time of the alleged
offense. Nemo plus iuris transferre potest quam ipse habet is
10 2
millennia old and inarguably an accepted rule of international law.
The Court must respect its normative impact as part of "the
principles and rules of international law." 10 3 ICC jurisdiction is
merely derivative of sovereign domestic jurisdiction, and was
intentionally designed to be so in the absence of a Chapter VII
Resolution conferring jurisdiction. For much the same reason, an
Occupying Power does not lawfully acquire title to personal or state
property within the zone of occupation and thus cannot sell or
otherwise dispose of such properties. 10 4 Jurisdictional allocations
prescribed in the Rome Statute do not present intractable difficulties
for States Parties with the caveat that no state can transfer more
jurisdictional authority to the ICC than it possesses under "applicable
treaties" 10 5 at the time of the alleged offense.
To date, the Court's disregard of underlying treaty-based
jurisdictional allocations undermines its intellectual consistency.
Under the tenets of Article 12, personal jurisdiction over a particular
perpetrator attaches only on the basis of territoriality or nationality
rather than as a necessary byproduct of functionalist treaty
interpretation. The Court has no treaty basis under the Rome Statute
for claiming a universal scope of punitive authority over all potential
perpetrators in all circumstances. Even if the actus reus of a
particular offense might have been committed, the OTP must make a
legally defensible, objective, and apolitical assessment that "there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime

within the jurisdiction of the Court."106 Of course, the nationals of
States Parties and non-States Parties are dissimilar in that the Rome
Statute permits nationality-based jurisdiction in the Court over the
citizens of 123 states, 10 7 even when the receiving state otherwise has

no basis for asserting territorial jurisdiction.

102.
MAARTEN Bos, A METHODOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1984).
103.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(1)(b).
104.
RAPHAEL LEMKIN, 1 AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE: LAWS OF
OCCUPATION, ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS 43 (1944).
105.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(1)(b).
106.
Id. art. 58(1)(a).
107.
See International Criminal Court, The State Parties to the Rome Statute,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en-menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%2Ostates%20parties%
20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx [perma.cc/9WEN-LPGW] (archived Feb. 7, 2016).
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To reiterate, the act of transferring territorial jurisdiction over a
state that is not party to the Rome Statute can be done perfectly
consistent with the VCLT if the territorial state has a colorable
claim to jurisdiction at the time of the alleged offense. 10 8 In
this sense, the territorial state transfers its own authority in the
same manner that the co-owner of a house could choose to sell or to
transfer his/her property right without the consent of the other coowner. On the other hand, if the territorial state has no legally
cognizable claim (i.e., possessory interest) to criminal jurisdiction
over a particular class of perpetrators at the time of the alleged
offense/s then it has nothing to transfer to the supranational court
irrespective of ostensible obligations under the Rome Statute. The
underlying web of binding jurisdictional treaties inevitably affects the
Court in three important circumstances, which will be summarized in
seriatim below: (1) when States Parties have established treaty-based
concurrent jurisdiction with other states, (2) when the UN Security
Council curtails ICC jurisdiction, and (3) when a State Party has
voluntarily surrendered its prosecutorial prerogatives.
As Chief Justice Marshall explained in Schooner Exchange,
allocations of jurisdiction between sovereigns remain "rather
questions of policy than of law" and "are for diplomatic, rather than
legal discussion."'10 9 There are no a priori rules under international
criminal law nor drawn from customary international law that give
preference to one jurisdictional basis when two or more states possess
concurrent jurisdiction. 1 10 More than 40 percent of the States Parties
to the ICC share concurrent jurisdiction with non-States Parties. The
concurrent jurisdiction embodied in the NATO SOFA, for example,
governs more than fifty States Parties as it binds all NATO members
as well as the nations that participate in NATO Partnership for Peace
(PfP) program. 11 1 In addition, Japan, 112 the Republic of Korea, and

108.
But see 22 U.S.C. § 7421(11) (2002) (reflecting the political posture of the
United States Congress, notably without any legal analysis, that "[it is a fundamental
principle of international law that a treaty is binding upon its parties only and that it
does not create obligations for nonparties without their consent to be bound. The
United States is not a party to the Rome Statute and will not be bound by any of its
terms. The United States will not recognize the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court over United States nationals").
Schooner Exchange, 7 Cranch at 143, 146.
109.
ANTONIO CASSESSE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 348 (2d ed. 2003).
110.
111.
See Signatures of Partnership for Peace Framework, NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY ORGANIZATION, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics-82584.htm [https://
perma.cc/7BCA-BYZJ] (archived Jan. 22, 2016).
112.
See, e.g., Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation
and Security: Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in
Japan, U.S.-Japan, Jan. 19, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 1652 (SOFA in the form of an executive
agreement pursuant to a treaty).

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

400

[VOL. 49:371

the Philippines1 1 3 are all ICC States Parties that share concurrent
jurisdiction with the United States pursuant to binding SOFA
provisions. As a normal operating principle, where two states exercise
concurrent jurisdiction, transfer of authority from the State Party to
the Court does not vitiate the jurisdiction of the non-State Party
insofar as jurisdiction technically remains intact but is effectively
displaced by the sovereign act of the State Party.
Arguments of some academics that the VCLT prohibits
transferred territoriality are misplaced because the Rome Statute
does not impose obligations on non-States Parties beyond those
exercised by any sovereign state through its exercise of treaty-based
concurrent criminal jurisdiction. 1 14 The possibility that a State Party
can be subject to seemingly inconsistent duties vis-&-vis another state
based on one treaty obligation and a different duty to the ICC based
on the Rome Statute could well present States Parties with
excruciatingly delicate political decisions. Article 90 of the Rome
Statute1 15 appears to anticipate precisely this dilemma. It specifically
addresses the process to be followed when a State Party receives
competing requests for extradition of a particular perpetrator. 1 16 By
its very terms, Article 90(4) requires States Parties to comply with
their underlying "international obligation to extradite" a perpetrator
back to a state that is not a member of the ICC (such as the United
States or Israel) even when transfer of that same person has been
requested by the ICC. 1 17 Instances of truly concurrent jurisdiction
thus create the appearance of conflicting legal obligation rather than
an intractable inconsistency with the Rome Statute.
The second common situation leads to the converse result yet is
also in complete conformity with the Rome Statute. 118 Under Article
13 of the Statute, the Security Council may refer situations to the
ICC based upon the finding that impunity threatens international

113.
Agreement regarding the treatment of the United States armed forces
visiting the Phillipines, U.S.-Phil., April 2, June 11 and 21, 1993, Bilateral Treaties in
Force as of Jan. 1, 2013.
The debate over the constitutionality of U.S. accession to the Rome Statute
114.
on the basis of its different due process standards mirrored earlier debates regarding
the jurisdictional provisions of the Genocide Convention. Both arguments are
inaccurate. Myres S. McDougal & Richard Arens, The Genocide Convention and the
Constitution, 3 VAND. L. REV. 683 (1950).
115.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 90.
116.
Id. Article 90 implicitly concedes the point of this Article in that there is no
embedded presumption that ICC jurisdiction automatically preempts competing
domestic jurisdictional authority.
117.
Id. art. 90(4).

118.

But see Deborah Ruiz Verduzzo, The RelationshipBetween the ICC and the

United Nations Security Council, in THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 30, 36 (Carsten Stahn ed., 2015) (positing with no evidence or
analysis that the position of the Security Council with respect to Resolutions 1593 and
1970 "goes against the Rome Statute").
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peace and security.1 1 9 Such referrals are not limited by the
nationality or territoriality constraints derived from state consent
under the normal provisions of Article 12.120 The 2005 referral of ICC
jurisdiction over Darfur was the first such constitutive act in the
history of the Court. 12 1 As a more recent marquee example, UN
Security Council Resolution 1973122 empowered states to "use all
necessary means" to protect civilians inside Libya and to enforce the
no-fly zone over Libyan territory. This Chapter VII decision was
implemented in the shadow of the previous referral of jurisdiction to
the Court over the situation in Libya by virtue of Resolution 1970.123
Resolution 1970 mirrored the language of the earlier Darfur
Resolution by expressly providing that
nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a State outside the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of
that State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to
operations in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya established or authorized by the
Council, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by the
State.

124

Thus, every time it has created ICC jurisdictional authority, the
Security Council has simultaneously constrained the reach of that
authority over the nationals of non-States Parties to the Rome
Statute. This is indistinguishable from the Security Council
Resolutions creating the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, which gave each ad hoc tribunal legal authority, but

119.
Rome Statute, supranote 1, art. 13(b).
120.
See The Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-3, Decision on the
Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al
Bashir, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 7 36-42 (Mar. 4, 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.inticcdocs/
doc/doc1759849.pdf [https://perma.cc/C68T-ZNB4] (archived Feb. 18, 2016).
121.
See S.C. Res. 1593, 1 (Mar. 15, 2005), http://www.icc.cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/
85febdla-29f8-4ec4-9566-48edf55cc587/283244/n0529273.pdf
[perma.cc/85SA-GG6G]
(archived Jan. 22, 2016) (stating simply that the Security Council Acting under
Chapter VII "[d]ecides to refer the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court").
122.
S.C.
Res.
1973
(Mar.
17,
2011),
http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/docUNDOC/GENINl l1/268/39/PDF/Nl126839.pdf?OpenElement
[perma.cc/D2YA-6MMAI (archived Feb. 7, 2016).
123.
S.C.
Res.
1970,
1 4 (Feb. 26, 2011), http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/docJUNDOC/GENINl l1245/581PDFINl124558.pdf?OpenElement
[perma.cc/K8NG-MS7A] (archived Feb. 7, 2016).
124.
Id. 6; see S.C. Res. 1593, 6 (providing that "nationals, current or former
officials or personnel from a contributing State outside Sudan which is not a party to
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of that contributing State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or
related to operations in Sudan established or authorized by the Council or the African
Union, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by that
contributing State.").
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simultaneously constrained jurisdictional scope based on articulated
125
geographic and temporal limits.
Jurisdictional limitations prescribed by Security Council
Resolutions do not represent amendments to the Rome Statute
because they conform to the intent of Article 13(b) and wellestablished international practice. 126 To be clear, Resolution 1970
was unanimously adopted by the Security Council and received the
affirmative votes of ten ICC States Parties, to include Germany,
France, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and Portugal. The
Secretary-General spoke in favor of the Resolution. The President of
the Council voiced the only note of caution regarding the
speaking in his capacity as the
jurisdictional carve-out,
127
Brazil.
of
representative
States have therefore consented to the premise of the UN
Charter that the Security Council may override otherwise binding
treaty obligations within the scope of its Chapter VII powers. 128 It is

125.
See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defense
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 45 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995), http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appea/decisione/51O02.htm
[https://perma.cc/W2LP-X4BF] (archived Feb. 18, 2016).
Though the Security Council failed to pass a Chapter VII resolution with
126.
respect to the situation in Syria because both China and Russia exercised their veto
power based on other concerns, the draft Resolution S/2014/348 also contained the
same jurisdictional limitation in paragraph 7. This language caused Argentina to voice
its concerns as follows:
The Security Council does not have the power to declare an
amendment to the Statute in order to grant immunity to nationals
of States non-Parties who commit crimes under the Statute in a
situation referred to the Court. That is to say, nothing in the text of
paragraph 7 would have given the power to amend the standard of
the Statute with regard to the Court's jurisdiction in a given
situation or the fact that if a decision is needed, the Court is
ultimately the judge of its own jurisdiction.
The Situation in the Middle East (Syria), Record of Debates on draft
Resolution, S/2014/348, 11 (May 22, 2014).
127.
See Peace and Security in Africa, U.N. Doc. S[PV.6491 (February 26, 2011),
[https://perma.cc/
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view-doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6491
5HP6-M7GE] (archived Feb. 7, 2016) ("Brazil is a long-standing supporter of the
integrity and universality of the Rome Statute. We oppose the exemption from
jurisdiction of nationals of those countries not parties to the Rome Statute. In the face
of the gravity of the situation in Libya and the urgent need for the Council to send a
strong, unified message, my delegation supported this resolution. However, we express
our strong reservation concerning paragraph 6. We reiterate our conviction that
initiatives aimed at establishing exemptions of certain categories of individuals from
the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court are not helpful to advancing the
cause of justice and accountability and will not contribute to strengthening the role of
the Court.").
128.
See U.N. CHARTER art. 103 (providing that Charter obligations "shall
prevail" over inconsistent treaty obligations); Questions of Interpretation and
Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at
Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. Rep. 114, 126-27 (Provisional Measures Order of
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of course true that the ICC exercises a sui generis scope of authority
within its mandate as a supranational organization with an
independent "international legal personality." 129 Some academics
infer that Council-imposed jurisdictional limitations over non-States
Parties "have no place"'130 in Article 13(b) referrals because the ICC is
not similarly situated to a sovereign state obligated by the UN
Charter to "accept and carry out the decisions of the Security
Council. '13 1 This line of logic misapprehends the true nature of ICC
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction under Article 13(b) actually originates by
virtue of Security Council action, which itself manifests the intention
of its members acting in their sovereign capacity.
The Court is a secondary subject of international law constituted
by the common will of states through the act of transferring their
powers. Both the jurisdictional scope of the Court and the range of
substantive offenses it is empowered to investigate are limited by the
authority conveyed from states. Thus, it cannot exercise more power
than it has been granted by its creators. 132 With respect to the
creation of ICC jurisdiction under Article 13(b), the limited scope of
allocation is absolutely binding because the Court cannot simply
create its own jurisdictional authority over non-States Parties. 133 The
ICC, of course, exercises the full scope of its delegated jurisdiction
with institutional independence and (theoretical) apolitical autonomy.
As the International Court of Justice opined in Congo v. Belgium,
"immunity from jurisdiction

.

.

.

does not mean that

[alleged

134

perpetrators] enjoy impunity."
There is accordingly no basis for
sustaining a presumption that circumscribed ICC jurisdiction over
citizens of non-States Parties violates international law in general or
obviates the core object and purpose of the Rome Statute.
The situations in Afghanistan and Palestine illustrate the third
strand of confluence, and for our purposes the most salient. At the
same time, purported conflicts between the obligations of the Rome
Statute and underlying but equally authoritative treaty norms can be
resolved in an intellectually consistent manner. The ICC is not an allApr. 14) (holding that a Security Council resolution superseded whatever rights Libya
may have enjoyed under a pre-existing treaty).
129.
Rome Statute, supranote 1, art. 4(1).
130.
Rod Rastan, Jurisdiction, in THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 141, 162-63 (Carsten Stahn ed., 2015).
131.
U.N. Charter, art. 25.
132.
See August Reinisch, Developing Human Rights and HumanitarianLaw
Accountability of the Security Council for the Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 95 AM.
J. INT'L L. 851, 858 (2001).
133.
It must also be clearly understood that the limitation of Court jurisdiction
in the Libya situation has no bearing whatever on other existing grounds for national
jurisdiction derived from other sources, such as universal jurisdiction based on
violations of the grave breach provisions of the Geneva Conventions or the Torture
Convention or any other domestic statutory authority.
134.
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment,
2002 ICJ Rep. 1, 60 (Feb. 14).
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encompassing judicial authority. Upon entry into the ASP, both
Afghanistan and Palestine conveyed jurisdiction within the meaning
of Article 12, but the quantum of that delegated jurisdiction is limited
by their preexisting treaty-based constraints. 135
Neither Afghanistan nor Palestine can convey juridical authority
to the Court over all alleged offenses perpetrated by all persons on
their territory because they do not enjoy exhaustive jurisdictional
power. To be precise, no scholar or politician can authoritatively
describe the territorial boundaries of a Palestinian state at the time
of this writing. The ICC website implicitly concedes that the scope of
territorial jurisdiction purportedly conveyed by the PA is legally
indeterminate. On the top of the entry page to the ICC website, users
can scroll over the listing of situations under investigation and those
under preliminary examination; when a mouse cursor touches the
name of each state its geographic contours pop up along with its
name, except for Palestine. 13 6 As a necessary predicate to proceeding
with any investigation based on territoriality, the Court must create
its own template for the scope of legal authority conveyed by the
Palestinian Authority under the Rome Statute.
In any event, there is nothing in the Rome Statute or in state
practice that compels the conclusion that the States Parties have an
unyielding obligation to confer all traces of sovereign prosecutorial
authority to the Court. Nor can it acquire more authority than that
bestowed by its creators in the text of the multilateral treaty. The
Court is a "derivative" or "secondary" subject of international law in
the sense that it does not possess any original powers or sovereign
authority in its own right. 137 Nemo plus iuris transferrepotest quam
ipse habet. In the situations of Afghanistan and Palestine, the
quantum of territorial jurisdiction is received by the Court "subject to
all burdens resting upon it. ' 138 This section concludes by detailing
the treaty-based
limitations
on the otherwise unfettered
jurisdictional delegations of Afghanistan and Palestine at the time of
their accession to the Rome Statute.

135.
Roman law distinguished between original ownership (in which the thing
owned is created by a person that had no predecessor in title) and derivative (by which
ownership is transferred). CARL SADOWSKI, INSTITUTES AND HISTORY OF ROMAN
PRIVATE LAW WITH CATENA OF TEXTS 88 (E.E. Whitfield trans. & ed., 1886).
136.
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Jan. 24, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/
ENMenus/icc/Pages/default.aspx [perma.cc/XK5Y-9X9F] (archived Jan. 24, 2016).

137.
August Reinisch, Developing Human Rights and Humanitarian Law
Accountability of the Security Council for the Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 95 AM.
J. INT'L L. 851, 858 (2001).
138.
CHARLES PHINEAS SHERMAN, II ROMAN LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 202
(2d. ed. 1924).
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1. Afghanistan
13 9
As a non-State Party, even if one or more Americans
committed a prohibited actus reus within the temporal jurisdiction of
the Court, there is no basis of territoriality nor of nationality to

support an assertion of ICC prosecutorial prerogative for acts alleged
in Afghanistan. Afghanistan deposited its instrument of ratification
to the Rome Statute on February 10, 2003, which meant that the
treaty entered into force for Afghanistan on May 1, 2003.140 In its
December 2014 Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, the

OTP concluded that "[t]he ICC therefore has jurisdiction over Rome
Statute crimes committed on the territory of Afghanistan or by its

nationals from 1 May 2003 onwards." 14 1 The OTP publicly disclosed
its investigation into possible detainee mistreatment and abuse
committed by "international forces within the temporal jurisdiction of
the Court" and singled out American armed forces for further
examination based on allegations of misconduct against unnamed
individuals

from

May 2003 to June

2004.142

Article

12 conveys

jurisdiction over crimes committed on the territory of Afghanistan, so

On 31 December 2000, which was the last day permitted by the treaty, the
139.
United States signed the Rome Statute at the direction of President Clinton. See Rome
Statute, supra note 1,art. 125(1). The White House statement clarified that President
Clinton ordered the signature because the United States seeks to "remain engaged in
making the ICC an instrument of impartial and effective justice in the years to come."
Statement on the Rome Treaty on the InternationalCriminal Court (Dec. 31, 2000), 37
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 4 (2001), reprinted in DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2000, 272 (Sally J. Cummins & David P. Stewart eds.),
[perma.cc/7ULW-6TEC]
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/139599.pdf
(archived Jan. 24, 2016). President Clinton made clear that he would "not recommend
that my successor submit the Treaty to the Senate for [ratification] until our
fundamental concerns are satisfied." In its operative paragraph, President Clinton,
wrote that
In signing, however, we are not abandoning our concerns about
significant flaws in the Treaty. In particular, we are concerned that
when the Court comes in existence, it will not only exercise
authority over personnel of States that have ratified the treaty, but
also claim jurisdiction over personnel of States that have
not ....Signature will enhance our ability to further protect U.S.
officials from unfounded charges and to achieve the human rights
and accountability objectives of the ICC. In fact, in negotiations
following the Rome Conference, we have worked effectively to
develop procedures that limit the likelihood of politicized
prosecutions. For example, U.S. civilian and military negotiators
helped to ensure greater precision in the definitions of crimes
within the Court's jurisdiction.
Id. at 273.
140.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 126(2).
The Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, Report on
141.
76 (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
PreliminaryExamination Activities,
otp/OTP-Pre-Exam-2014.pdf [perma.cc/K2R8-UZWK] (archived Jan. 24, 2016).
Id.
94-96.
142.
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the OTP assumption appears to reflect a straightforward, if
superficial, assessment of the Statute.
However, this view overlooks a series of jurisdictional
agreements that curtailed the permissible scope of Afghani territorial
jurisdiction. The Security Council authorized deployment of an
Interim Security Force to Afghanistan in Resolution 1386, adopted in
December 2001.143 As early as January 4, 2002, the British force
commander of the Interim Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
negotiated and signed a comprehensive agreement with the interim
government in Afghanistan. 144 The ISAF Agreement included an
Annex entitled "Arrangements Regarding the Status of the
International Security Assistance Force." 14 5 The Annex provided,
inter alia, that "ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated
liaison personnel, will under all circumstances and at all times be
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective national
elements in respect of any criminal or disciplinary offences which
may be committed by them on the territory of Afghanistan."'146 The
Annex implicitly relied on Article 98 as well by providing that all
ISAF personnel are immune from arrest or detention by Afghan
authorities and may not be turned over to any international tribunal
or any other entity or State without the express consent of the
contributing nation. 14 7 Notice the intent of the parties to make the
preclusive jurisdictional effects as broad as possible by covering "all
circumstances and at all times."
This early agreement comports with the intent of Article 98
insofar as it specifically prevents non-consensual transfer.148
However, given that the agreement retained its legal force and effect
following Afghan accession to the Rome Statute, it represents an
indivisible whole with respect to territorial jurisdiction over the
nationals of non-States Parties. In other words, the scope of Afghani

143.
S.C. Res. 1386 (Dec. 20, 2001), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/docUNDOC/
GEN/NOl1/708/55/PDF[NO170855.pdf?OpenElement [perma.ec/A6CP-BX9E] (archived
Feb. 7, 2016).

144.

Letter dated 14 January 2002 from the Permanent Representative of the

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations
Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2002/117 (Jan. 25,
2002), http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/9BllC79DE13BB700C1256
B5300381E4F-unsc-afg-25jan.pdf [perma.cc/7HND-5T3K] (archived Jan. 24, 2016).
145.
Id.
146.
Id. 3.
147.
Id. 4.
148.
American officials later negotiated a stand-alone supplemental Article 98
agreement with Afghanistan that was signed in Washington on September 20, 2002.
Agreement between the Government of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan
and the Government of the United States of America regarding the surrender of
persons to the International Criminal Court, Transitional Islamic State-U.S., Sept. 20,
2002, https://www.law.georgetown.edullibrary/researchlguidesupload/Afghanistano3119.pdf [perma.cc/YAP9-Q3QN] (archived Jan. 24, 2016).
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territorial jurisdiction was voluntarily constrained effective January
4, 2002, and thus correspondingly curtailed when transferred to the
ICC beginning in May 2003. As noted above, there is no basis in the
Rome Statute for the ICC to assert that its authority over crimes
committed by nationals of non-States Parties on the territory of a
State Party derives from some independent or transcendent purpose
that obviates the need to obtain the consent of the territorial state.
It is important to note in this context that the permanent
agreement reached between Afghanistan and NATO on September
20, 2014, included nearly identical language revalidating exclusive
jurisdiction to all NATO nations.149 It also included explicit language
noting that the permanent agreement does not "limit or prejudice the
implementation" of any "bilateral Agreement or Arrangement" then
in force for Afghanistan. 150 Many Americans deployed to Afghanistan
did so under the auspices of ISAF, but many more deployed in
distinctive operational lines of command and control as part of
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).15 1 The treaty 1 52 that applied to
American personnel during OEF took the form of an exchange of
diplomatic notes (thus conforming to the description above).
Afghanistan relinquished any claim to criminal jurisdiction over
the nationals of the United States by accepting that they are accorded
status equivalent to that accorded to the administrative and technical
staff of the Embassy of the United States of America under the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961.153 By
conveying full immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the host
nation for offenses alleged on its territory, such status (termed A&T
P&I by military practitioners) is just one notch below full diplomatic

149.
Agreement between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on the Status of NATO Forces and NATO personnel
conducting mutually agreed NATO-led activities in Afghanistan, U.S.-Afg., art. 11(1),
Sept.
30,
2014,
http:/fwww.nato.int/cps/ennatohq/official-texts-1 16072.htm
[perma.cc/B98K-MA2E] (archived Jan. 24, 2016) ("Afghanistan, while retaining its
sovereignty, recognizes the particular importance of disciplinary control, including
judicial and non-judicial measures, by NATO Forces Authorities over Members of the
Force and Members of the Civilian Component and NATO Personnel. Afghanistan
therefore agrees that the State to which the Member of the Force or Members of the
Civilian Component concerned belongs, or the State of which the person is a national,
as appropriate, shall have the exclusive right to exercise jurisdiction over such persons
in respect of any criminal or civil offenses committed in the territory of Afghanistan.").
150.
Id. art. 24.
151.
ISAF began its operations as a result of the Security Council decision,
while the legal authority for coalition forces participating in Enduring Freedom
originated with the sovereign right of individual and collective self-defense.
152.
VCLT, supra note 24, art. 2(1) (defining a treaty as "an international
agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international
law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments
and whatever its particular designation").
153.
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocol on
Disputes art. 37(2), April 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. 7502.
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immunity enjoyed by the Ambassador upon delivery of his full powers
instrument1 54 to the sovereign government. The Vienna Convention
is absolutely clear that persons enjoying A&T P&I status are fully
immune from host nation criminal law for all purposes at all times
and subject to limited civil immunity only for acts undertaken in their
official capacity. In its reply dated December 12, 2002, the Afghan
Foreign Ministry declared "its concurrence" with the curtailed scope
of sovereign criminal jurisdiction. 15 5 In a second demarche dated May
28, 2003, Afghanistan reiterated its concurrence and noted that the
agreement entered into force on that date pursuant to the Foreign
156
Minister's signature.
The United States arguably had exclusive jurisdiction over any
U.S. national alleged to have committed any cognizable criminal
offense within Afghanistan as early as the December 12
"concurrence.' 157 There is simply no credible argument that
Afghanistan had any lawful authority to prosecute American forces
for any acts committed on or after May 28, 2003. Acts that were
literally committed "on the territory" of Afghanistan could therefore
not lawfully be delegated to the ICC based on the principle of
transferred territoriality that is the bedrock of Article 12 authority
over the nationals of non-States Parties. Any other reading of Article
12 would warp its entire meaning within the larger context of the
Rome Statute. The consequences for the larger body of treaty norms
occasioned by the OTP assumption of such power will be considered
in Part IV below.
2. The West Bank and Gaza
The legal situation in the Occupied Territories is more
controversial and, it must be said, more straightforward based on the
relevant treaty texts. Officials of the PA attempted to leverage the

154.
VCLT, supra note 24, art. 7(1) (providing the framework for assessing the
legally binding authority of persons who purport to speak on behalf of states as either
producing "appropriate full powers" or when the practice of the state or from other
circumstances that the "intention was to consider that person as representing the State
for such purposes").
155.
Agreement regarding the Status of United States Military and Civilian
Personnel of the U.S. Department of Defense Present in Afghanistan in connection
with Cooperative Efforts in Response to Terrorism, Humanitarian and Civic
Assistance, Military Training and Exercises, and Other Activities, U.S.-Afg., Exchange
of notes September 26 and December 12, 2002 and May 28, 2003, T.I.A.S., State Dep't
No. 03-67, 2003 WL 21754316, 6192 KAV i (entered into force May 28, 2003).
156.
Id.
157.
Ari6 E. David, Faits Accomplis in Treaty Conflicts, 6 INVL L. 88, 98 n.13
(1972) (citing the example of the Soviet government that renounced the Treaty of
Brest-Litovsk in 1918 through a radio proclamation "addressed to everybody" which
was in due course regarded in 1925 by a German court as "sufficient expression" that
the Soviet government regarded the treaty as abrogated and invalid).
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threat of ICC accession to achieve diplomatic progress towards
formalized international recognition as a state. The PA delegate
participated in the thirteenth meeting of the ASP as an "invited
observer state" for the first time in December 2014. He challenged the
Court to use its power to prosecute Israelis for "war crimes and
crimes against humanity" being perpetrated in the Occupied
Territories. 158 On December 30, 2014, Jordan introduced a draft
Security Council Resolution that would have mandated a "just,
lasting, and comprehensive" 1 59 negotiated settlement between Israel
and Palestine that recognized mutually agreed borders of both states
and mandated an end to the Israeli occupation by the end of 2017.160
The Resolution failed to achieve the requisite affirmative votes,
16 1
thereby avoiding the necessity for any veto by a member of the P-5.
In response to that diplomatic defeat, the PA submitted its third
declaration under Article 12(3) of the Statute for "crimes . . .
committed in the occupied ... territory, including East Jerusalem,
since June 13, 2014," on the following day. 16 2 The date chosen as the
temporal beginning of ICC authority coincided with the beginning of
the controversial military campaign known as Tzuk Eitan by which
Israeli forces entered the Gaza Strip to root out the tunnel complexes
from which Hamas continued to fire indiscriminate missiles against
Israeli homes. 16 3 The PA later deposited its full instrument of
ratification to the Rome Statute on January 2, 2015, which had the
legal effect of transferring territorial and nationality-derived

158.
Dr. Riyad Mansour, Ambassador, Statement by the Permanent Observer
Mission of the State of Palestine to the United Nations before the Assembly of State
Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (thirteenth session)
(Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp-docs/ASP13/GenDeba/ICC-ASP13GenDeba-Palestine-ENG.pdf [perma.cc/RT3S-DULQ] (archived Jan. 24, 2016).
159.
S.C.
draft
Res.
916,
$
11
(Dec.
30,
2014),
http://www.un.org/en/galsearch/view-doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/916
[perma.cc/J9649FHL] (archived Jan. 24, 2016).
160.
See U.N. SCOR, 69th Sess., 7354th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.7354, The
Situation in the Middle East including the Palestinian question (Dec. 30, 2014),
http://www.un.org/enlgalsearch/view-doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7354
[perma.ccINMF3LQXB] (archived Jan. 24, 2016).
161.
Id.
162.
Declaration Accepting the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court, President Abbas of Palestine, (Dec. 31, 2014), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
PIDS/press/Palestine AJ12-3.pdf [perma.cc/QW2S-7LGL] (archived Jan. 24, 2016).
163.
See, e.g, SPECIAL REPORT: OPERATION PROTECTIVE EDGE, https://
www.idfblog.com/operationgaza20l4/#Home [perma.cc/7YBS-JULH] (archived Jan. 24,
2016); Rep. of the Detailed Findings of the Independent Comm'n of Inquiry Established
Pursuant to H.R.C. res. S-21/1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/52 (Jun. 24, 2015),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies[HRC/CoIGazaConflict[PageslReportCoIGaza.aspx
[perma.cc/D7G9-CM8N] (archived Jan. 24, 2016).
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jurisdiction in accordance with Article 12 of the Statute, effective on
164
the date the treaty entered into force for Palestine.
There has been a tremendous amount of academic literature
dedicated to considering the validity of previous PA attempts to
convey jurisdiction to the Court under Article 12(3)165 and the
corollary question whether it qualifies as a "state" within the
meaning of that Article for the purposes of ICC accession. 166 It is
widely known that the first ICC Prosecutor declined to accept the
previous PA proffers, 16 7 but did so on a dubious legal basis.
Depending upon the Court's ultimate decision regarding the previous
efforts to instantiate Court jurisdiction, ICC authority may be limited
to acts committed on or after April 1, 2015,168 which is the date that
16 9
the Statue entered into force for Palestine.
In any event, there are at least three evident conclusions at the
time of this writing. Firstly, the General Assembly Resolution
granting Palestine "non-member observer status" 170 paired with the
acceptance of Palestine into the ASP is dispositive in interpreting the
breadth of Article 12 for the purposes of its sui generis meaning
within the Rome Statute. 17 1 Secondly, Professor Schabas is correct
that there is no requirement that the territorial jurisdiction conferred

164.
State of Palestine: Accession, C.N.13.2015.Treaties-XVIII.10 (Depositary
Notification, Jan. 6, 2015), https:H/treaties.un.org/docPublication/CN/2015/CN. 13.2015Eng.pdf [perma.ccV64R-WW7C] (archived Jan. 24, 2016).
165.
See, e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, Israel/Palestine: The ICC's Uncharted
Territory, 11 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 979 (2013) (discussing the challenge of the legality of
Israeli settlement on the West Bank under ICC jurisdiction); Malcolm N. Shaw, The

Article 12(3) Declarationof the PalestinianAuthority, the InternationalCriminal Court,
and InternationalLaw, 9 J. INT. CRIM. JUST. 301, 321 (2011); William Thomas Worster,
The Exercise of Jurisdictionby the InternationalCriminal Court over Palestine,26 AM.
U. INT'L L. REV. 1153 (2012).
166.
JOHN QUIGLEY, THE STATEHOOD OF PALESTINE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT (2010); Yael Ronen, ICC Jurisdictionover Acts Committed
in the Gaza Strip, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 3, 6 (2010); Yuval Shany, In Defense of
Functional Interpretation of Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
329, 338 (2010) (noting that "the Palestinian territories (with the exception of East
Jerusalem) are not the object of a competing sovereignty claim by Israel or any other
state, means that by accepting the PNA declaration and relying on it to investigate the
situation in Gaza, the Prosecutor or the Court would not be required to decide a
contentious sovereignty claim.").
167.
Situation
in Palestine,
ICC (April
3, 2012),
http://www.icccpi.int/NRlrdonlyres/C6162BBF-FEB9-4FAF-AFA9836106D2694A/284387/SituationinPalestineO3O4l2ENG.pdf
[perma.cc/FWL4-HQLY]
(archived Jan. 24, 2016).
168.
See Mohamed M. El Zeidy, Ad Hoc Declarations of Acceptance of
Jurisdiction:The PalestinianSituation under Scrutiny, in THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 179, 1999 (Carsten Stahn ed., 2015).
169.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 126(2).
170.
G.A. Res. 52/164 (Nov. 29, 2012).
171.
VCLT, supra note 24, art. 31(3)(b) (stating that the text of the treaty can
be interpreted in light of "[a]ny subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation").
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upon the Court by ratification or accession is limited to territory over
172
which a State exercises effective control at the time of accession.
The key issue is sovereignty along with its correlative power to
enforce criminal law or to delegate that enforcement to another state
or entity. The precise boundaries of Palestine are indeterminate at
the time of this writing. It follows that even if the PA possessed the
authority to transfer territorial jurisdiction to the ICC the scope of
that authority is opaque. Indeed, in the wake of the Oslo Accords,
both parties involved and the International Court of Justice have
173
avoided resolution of "permanent status issues such as borders."
The OTP cannot possibly ascertain the precise geographic boundaries
of authoritative territorial jurisdiction transferred to the Court under
Article 12. Finally, and most importantly, the transferred territorial
jurisdiction of the ICC cannot be extended over Israeli citizens
because the PA has neither de facto nor de jure authority to claim
such criminal jurisdiction in its own right.
The law of occupation under the Fourth Geneva Convention and
the plain text of the Oslo Accords provide incontrovertible grounds for
denying Palestinian sovereignty over Israeli nationals in the
Occupied Territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Israel has
treated the Occupied Territory within the mandates of the laws and
customs of occupation since 1967. The 1949 Geneva Conventions
marked a definitive rejection of the concept of debellatio, under which
the occupier assumed full sovereignty over the civilians in the
occupied territory. 17 4 A state of occupation does not "affect the legal
status of the territory in question," 175 hence its cornerstone is the
broad obligation that the foreign power must "take all the measures
in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order

172.
SCHABAS, supra note 33, at 285 (noting the theoretical possibility that
Syrian accession to the Rome Statute could convey territorial jurisdiction over the
Golan Heights because overall sovereignty is merely displaced by Israeli occupation).
173.
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 177-81 (July 9), reprinted in
43 I.L.M. 1009, 1038-39 (2004), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?pl=3&
[perma.cc/8X2S-WJRJ] (archived on Jan. 24, 2016).
174.
MORRIs GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 600-01 (1959).
Debellatio "refers to a situation in which a party to a conflict has been totally defeated
in war, its national institutions have disintegrated, and none of its allies continue
militarily to challenge the enemy on its behalf." EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF OCCUPATION 59 (1993).
175.
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for
signature Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 Annex I, art. 4, (entered into force Dec. 7,
1978), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977). U.S. policy in this regard is clear that "the
fact of occupation gives the Occupying Power the right to govern enemy territory
temporarily, but does not transfer sovereignty of occupied territory to the Occupying
Power." DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 48, 752, 111.4.
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and safety." 176 While the Supreme Court of the Netherlands has

noted that Israel does not have sovereign authority over the Occupied
Territory, it has upheld Israeli criminal jurisdiction over offenses
committed therein. 177 In the authoritative French text, the occupier
must preserve "lbordre et la vie publique" (i.e., public order and
life). 178 The corresponding duty found in Article 43 of the 1907 Hague
Regulations to respect local laws unless "absolutely prevented"
("emp~chement absolu") imposes a seemingly categorical imperative.
However, rather than being literal, "emp~chement absolu" has been
widely interpreted as the equivalent of "necessitg."179 Israeli law
applies to Israeli public servants, both civilian and military, for acts
180
committed within the Occupied Territories.
From the outset of the occupation, Israeli military authorities
exercised full authority over the criminal system in the Occupied
Territories 181 and have updated guidance to local commanders as
needed. 18 2 The Oslo Accords recognize the full "legislative, executive,
and judicial" authority of the Israeli military government "in
accordance with international law."183 The Israeli Supreme Court
sitting as the High Court of Justice held that "[a]s is well known,
Article 43 has been acknowledged in our rulings as a quasiconstitutional framework maxim of the belligerent occupation laws,
which sets a general framework for the manner by which the military
commander exercises its duties and powers in the occupied
territory." 18 4 The law of occupation "sets out the duty and power of
the military commander to maintain order and security in the
territory under his control. There is no doubt that one of the main

176.
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its
Annex, art. 43, Oct. 18, 1907 (emphasis added).
177.
HR 9 juni 2015, ECLI: NL: PHR: 2015: 967 (Neth.), http://uitspraken.
rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:PHR:2015:967
[perma.cc/2S2W-7T9Q]
(archived Feb. 7, 2016).
178.
The authoritative French text reads: 't'autorit6 du poivoir legal ayant
pass de fait entre les mains de l'occupant, celui-ci prendra toutes les mesures qui
dependent de lui en vue de r~tablir et d'assurer, autant qu'l est possible, l'order et la
vie publique end respectant, sauf empechement absolu les lois en virueur dans le pays."
179.
Yoram Dinstein, Legislation under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations:
Belligerent Occupation and Peacebuilding, No. 1, Program on HumanitarianPolicy
and Conflict Research, Harvard University Occasional Paper Series 4 (Fall 2004).
180.
DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE 20-29 (2002).
181.
Order Concerning Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria) 5727-1967.
182.
Order regarding Security Provisions [Consolidated Version] (Judea and
Samaria) (No. 1651), 5770-2009, May 2, 2010, http://nolegalfrontiers.org/enImilitaryorders/mil01 [perma.ccITP8H-KCAH] (archived Jan. 24, 2016).
183.
Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Isr.-Palestine,
art. XVII 4(b), Sept. 28, 1995, 36 I.L.M. 551 (1997) [hereinafter Oslo Il],
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3de5ebbc0.html [perma.cc/3P7F-D28F] (archived Jan.
24, 2016).
184.
HCJ 2164/09, Yesh Din v. Commander of IDF Forces in Judaea and
Samaria, et. al (Dec. 26, 2011) (Isr.).
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duties for which the military commander is responsible within this
framework is the duty to ensure that the law is upheld in the
territories." 18 5 Palestinian criminal jurisdiction thus does not include
Israeli citizens in the Occupied Territories under the laws and
18 6
customs of warfare.
While the Geneva Conventions preempt Palestinian jurisdiction
over Israelis as a general matter, the plain text of the Oslo Accords
does so with unmistakable precision. Under the 1995 Accords, "Israel
has sole criminal jurisdiction over . . . offenses committed in the
Territory by Israelis." 187 The Accords specify that the West Bank and
Gaza Strip constitute a "single territorial unit."188 Israeli citizens
cannot be arrested or detained by Palestinian authorities. 189 Neither
Israel nor the PA has abrogated the Accords, and Palestinian judges
that have attempted to exercise criminal authority over Israelis
following the General Assembly's acceptance of Palestine as a "nonmember observer state" have been removed from office by PA orders.
Security cooperation also continues in accordance with the terms of
Oslo II. The language of Article XVII, para. 2(a) is particularly
relevant in the context of a purported transfer of territorial
jurisdiction to the ICC: "The territorial jurisdiction of the Council
shall encompass Gaza Strip territory, except for the Settlements and
the Military Installation Area shown on map No. 2, and West Bank
territory, except for Area C which, except for the issues that will be
negotiated in the permanent status negotiations will be gradually
transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction in three phases .... "190 Annex
IV of the Accords reiterates this division of jurisdiction on the West

185.
HCJ 9593/04, Rashed Morar, Head of Yanun Village Council v. IDF
Commander in Judaea and Samaria, 2 Isr. L. Rep. 56,
30 (June, 26 2006); see also
HCJ 9132/07, Jaber Al-Bassiouni Ahmed et. al. v. Prime Minister et.al. 12 (Jan. 27,
2008) (Isr.) (holding that Israeli officials must comply with human rights imperatives).
186.
UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
275, 11.3 (2004).
187.
Oslo II, supra note 183, Annex IV, Art. 1(2)(b), http://www.mfa.gov.ilMFA
ForeignPolicy/Peace/Guide/PagesTHE%20ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN%20INTERIM%20
AGREEMENT%20.%2OAnnex%20IV.aspx#articlel
[perma.cc/8RCH-6TFF] (archived
Jan. 24, 2016) (Article 7b of the Annex also specifies that Israel has jurisdiction in the
Occupied Territory over crimes committed against Israel or against Israeli citizens);
GEOFFREY R. WATSON, THE OSLO ACCORDS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ISRAELIPALESTINIAN PEACE AGREEMENTS (2000).
188.
Oslo II, supranote 183, Article XVII, 1.
189.
This provision alone arguably makes the textual mandate of Article 98
binding upon the Court, as no Palestinian official has authority to hold or detain any
Israeli, much less authority to transfer non-existent criminal jurisdiction to any other
state or entity. As noted above, however, jurisdiction under Article 12 is a distinctive
issue from the limitation on the right of a State Party to transfer a particular
perpetrator envisioned under Article 98.
190.
West Bank: Area C Map, UN OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF
HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, https://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha-oparea-c-map_
2011_02_22.pdf [perma.cc/9CW6-RN4X] (archived Jan. 24, 2016).
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Bank as follows: Areas A (full Palestinian control), B (Palestinian
civil control and joint Palestinian-Israeli security control), and C (full
Israeli civil and security control, except over Palestinians). Area C
includes the settlements, their environs, and roadways.
Crimes committed by Israelis in Occupied West Bank or the
Gaza Strip are, under Oslo, solely Israel's to investigate and try.
Every treaty imposes binding obligations only upon the "parties to it,"
and accordingly it imposes obligations and bestows rights that "must
be performed by them in good faith." 191 Notwithstanding the import
of the pacta sunt servanda principle noted above, no Palestinian
official has proffered a public explanation justifying the authority of
the PA to delegate territorial authority over Israeli citizens in the
Occupied Territory to the ICC.

III. THE PROSECUTOR'S APPROACH UNDERMINES THE ROME STATUTE
ITSELF

This Article has thus far demonstrated the intellectual
dissonance between the derivative nature of ICC jurisdiction and the
assumption that it can disregard treaties by which both Afghanistan
and Palestine limited the quantum of their territorial jurisdiction.
The balance of the adjudicative authority between the supranational
Court and states is the bridge that bears the entire weight of the
enterprise. The Court's long-term viability, and its fidelity to the
object and purpose of the Statute, depends upon sustaining a
cooperative synergy with domestic jurisdictions, whether or not they
are States Parties.
The Court has no articulable basis for asserting an independent
claim to jurisdiction outside the scope of the Rome Statute. If the
Court is properly seized with jurisdiction, the intentions of states are
irrelevant to the disposition of any particular case. 19 2 Conversely,
States Parties cannot unilaterally empower the Court to disregard
grants of exclusive jurisdiction to another state absent a waiver of
jurisdiction by that state. Neither Afghanistan nor Palestine had any
right to assert jurisdiction over Americans or Israelis respectively;
neither had an ability to transfer territorial jurisdiction over all
perpetrators on their territory.
States Parties cannot modify their jurisdictional treaties through
a multilateral treaty that operates to disadvantage other states that

191.
VCLT, supra note 24, art. 26.
See Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), Preliminary
192.
Objection, 1957 I.C.J. Rep. 125 (Nov. 26); Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Ice.),
1973 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Feb. 2).
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are not direct parties to that treaty. 193 International law embeds a
long-standing premise that violations by one party do not ipso facto
invalidate the underlying treaties. 194 Afghanistan and Palestine
subverted the sovereign right to exercise exclusive personal
jurisdiction by purportedly transferring territoriality to the Court.
The United States or Israel could theoretically cite the act of
accession as the basis for exiting the earlier treaties based on the
breach by the other party. However, Afghanistan did not treat its
ratification of the Rome Statute as a repudiation of its SOFA
agreements, nor has Palestine in any way indicated its withdrawal
from the Oslo Accords. All of the relevant entities continue to regard
the jurisdictional allocations as binding.
The preceding raises the obvious question: Why should
transferred territoriality operate to defeat the diplomatic desires of
all the parties to the earlier agreements? The language of Article 12
is not literal because the territorial jurisdiction asserted by the Court
is constrained by the actual legal authority transferred from States
Parties rather than all-encompassing. As noted above, the transfer of
territorial jurisdiction does not necessarily imply an indivisible scope
of authority for the supranational court. The ICC does have territorial
jurisdiction over perpetrators on the soil of Afghanistan and Palestine
(assuming there is concrete agreement on the borders subject to such
jurisdiction). However, the purported conveyance of territorial
jurisdiction over nationals of those non-States Parties covered by the
relevant treaties was ultra vires and therefore without legal effect. It
follows that, for the purposes of military deployments, when receiving
states routinely allocate exclusive jurisdiction over nationals of
sending states, the Court cannot unilaterally assert that "there are
reasonable grounds to believe that a person has committed a crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court" over the nationals of non-States
Parties covered by those SOFAs.
The situations in Afghanistan and Palestine will transform the
Court's institutional arc. The paradox is that the very claims of
authority and prosecutorial power in principle may well lead to
decreased Court authority and prosecutorial effectiveness in practice.
It is appropriate to speak of the "Court" because jurisdictional
decisions by the OTP will be reviewed by the Pre-Trial1 95 and
Appeals Chambers. 196 The appropriate power of the OTP will be

193.
Quincy Wright, Conflicts Between InternationalLaw and Treaties, 11 AM.
J. INT'L L. 566, 568 (1917).
194.
LASSA FRANCIs LAWRENCE OPPENHEIM, I OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL
LAW § 165, at 547 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 6th ed. 1947).
195.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 19(1) ("The Court shall satisfy itself that
it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it."); Prosecutor v. Kony et. al., ICC-0210401/05-377, Decision on the admissibility of the case under article 19(1) of the Statute
(Mar. 9, 2009) (asserting that the Court will have the "last say" over its jurisdiction).
196.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 82.

416

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 49:371

sustainable only with relationships grounded in authentic
partnership with sovereign authorities. When a supranational Court
attempts to unilaterally repudiate the agreements of sovereign states,
it may well generate noncooperation by many states. Former UN
Secretary General Dag Hammarskjbld wrote, "There is a point at
which everything becomes simple and there is no longer any question
of choice, because all you have staked will be lost if you look back.
Life's point of no return." 197 The controversies sure to arise over the
situations in Palestine and Afghanistan will be emblematic data
points for all other cases and controversies.
It would also be ironic if the quintessential function of a Court
(in this instance, interpreting and applying the scope of its lawful
jurisdiction) reignites the undercurrent of contention over this
supranational Court's legitimacy. The Court does not have a
"completely free hand" in interpreting its jurisdictional scope because
it cannot "acquire a law-making capacity through its compdtence de la
compdtence."198 The Court will no doubt be under intense political
pressures to assert jurisdiction over Americans in Afghanistan and
over Israelis. The tension is between the politicized exploitation of the
jurisdictional boundaries enunciated in Article 12 and the need to
disprove the lingering undercurrent of distrust amongst the political
classes of non-States Parties. The residual ambiguity in Article 12
epitomizes what President Clinton termed "significant flaws in the
Treaty." 199 At the same time, Court supporters vehemently fought for
an independent propio motu power in a Prosecutor designed to
operate above the fray of international politics. 20 0 Limiting the
likelihood of politicized prosecutions was a core American negotiating
objective. The desire to prevent "unfounded charges" and "achieve the
human rights and accountability objectives of the ICC" while limiting
the "likelihood of politicized prosecutions" ought to be shared by every
nation.2 0 1 Apart from the very design of the treaty discussed in detail
above, this Part closes with two additional considerations that should
prevent supranational re-invention of territorial jurisdiction where
none actually exists.

197.
DAG HAMMARSKJOLD, MARKINGS 66 (Leif Sjbberg & W.H. Auden trans.,
1965).
MICHAIL VAGIAS, THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
198.
CRIMINAL COURT 88 (2014).
199.
Statement on the Rome Treaty on the International Criminal Court (Dec.
31, 2000), 37 WEEKLY. COMP. PRES. DoC. 4 (Jan. 8, 2001), reprinted in DIGEST OF
UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2000, supranote 139, at 272.
200.
SCHABAS, supra note 33, AT 315-20; Morten Bergsmo & Jelena Pejid,
Article 15, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: OBSERvERS' NOTES ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 581-85 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d. 2008).
201.
Statement on the Rome Treaty on the International Criminal Court, supra
note 199, at 273.
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A. Protectinga Perpetrator'sHuman Rights
The Court is designed from the ground up to respect the human
rights of potential perpetrators. The due process rights of
perpetrators are protected throughout the Statute in ways that often
tilt the interpretive balance away from the Chambers and the
Prosecutor. In the event of a change in the law applicable to a given
case prior to a final judgment, the law "more favourable to the person
being investigated, prosecuted or convicted shall apply." 20 2 Moreover,
the precept nullem crimen sine lege prevents jurisdiction absent
judicial determinations that "the conduct in question constitutes, at
the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court"
(emphasis added). 20 3 The corollary to this foundational human rights
tenet requires the presumption that conflicting interpretations of any
rule arising in the context of trial must be resolved favor rei. 2 04 In the
Bashir case, Pre-Trial Chamber I recognized that the substantive
scope of the Rome Statute "fully embraces the general principle of
interpretation in dubio pro reo."20 5 Phrased another way, if the
evidence at trial must be evaluated in the light most favorable to the
20 6
defendant, as must the specific substantive content of the charges,
why would jurisdiction be any different from a human rights
perspective? The idea that a perpetrator can be charged for acts that
are subject to prosecution in a forum that deprives the rightful
sovereign entity of jurisdiction and substitutes differing legal
standards and procedures than at the time of commission should be
anathema from a human rights perspective.
In this light, it is worth recalling that the centrality of treaty
agreements to deprive a host state of territorial jurisdiction springs
from the desire to protect the due process rights of accused
persons. 20 7 This principle is ubiquitous in military operations, to

202.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 24(2).
203.
Id. art. 22(1) (emphasis added).
204.
Nullum Crimen Sine Lege, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 438, 440 (Antonio Cassese ed., 2009).
205.
See The Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-3, Decision on the
Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al
Bashir, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 1 156 (Mar. 4, 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.inticcdoes/doc/
doc1759849.pdf [https://perma.cc/C68T-ZNB4] (archived Feb. 18, 2016).
206.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 22(2) ('The definition of a crime shall be
strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the
definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or
convicted.").
207.
John D. Negroponte, Remarks at Stakeout Following UN Security Council
Vote on Resolution 1422 (July 12, 2002), http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/io/rls/rm/2002/
11846.htm [perma.cc/KZA2-J9D7] (archived Feb. 7, 2016) ('The American system of
justice can be trusted to punish crimes, including war crimes or crimes against
humanity, committed by an American-and we pledge to do so. But we do not believe
the International Criminal Court contains sufficient safeguards to protect our
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include UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.
Deployed forces should enjoy the liberty to focus on their mission
rather than fear politicized prosecution in the domestic forums of
other nations using unfamiliar procedures and foreign tongues.
Treaty provisions that confer exclusive jurisdiction on a sending state
also prevent the receiving state from transferring jurisdictional
authority to a third state, which in turn necessarily precludes
transfer to a supranational jurisdiction. Such proceedings in other
forums that go beyond the lawful authority of the receiving state
could well represent judicial extension of hostilities, akin to
asymmetric warfare.
For much the same reason, all ICC personnel are accorded
"immunity from legal process of every kind" from the territorial
jurisdiction of States Parties "in respect of words spoken or written
and acts performed by them in their official capacity." 20 8 Imagine the
protestations that would arise from the Court if a State Party entered
into a subsequent agreement to transfer jurisdiction over Court
personnel despite the textual preclusion in the Rome Statute.
Similarly, the principle of ne bis in idem included in Article 20 does
not permit the Court to try a person "who has been tried by another
20 9
court for conduct also proscribed" unless it was not a genuine trial.
In sum, these provisions mean that when the due process rights of
perpetrators are preserved by treaty arrangements specifically
accepted by two states to preserve the domestic jurisdiction of one
state over crimes committed by its nationals on the territory of
another state, the Court interposes its limited authority only at the
expense of the due process protections negotiated by the sending
states.
B. Intentional Integrationin lieu of Creatinga Special (SelfContained)Regime
The object and purpose of the Statute models shared rights and
responsibilities by which the Court synergizes with domestic
prosecutors. Decisions by the OTP that invalidate jurisdictional
arrangements between sovereign states and operate to deprive states
of their criminal jurisdiction undermine the very raison d'etrg of the
institution. The field of international criminal law is emphatically not
the exclusive province of supranational tribunals like the ICC
because domestic courts are "formally distinct, but substantively
intertwined mechanisms that pursue a common goal: the

nationals, and therefore we can never in good conscience permit Americans to become
subject to its authority.").
208.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 48(2).
209.
Id. art. 20.
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enforcement" of crimes defined under international law. 210 The
Statute Preamble notes that "the most serious crimes of concern to
the international community must not go unpunished and that their
effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the
national level. '2 1 1 It amplifies the argument with the admonition in
Preambular paragraph 6 that "it is the duty of every State to exercise
its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international
2 12
crimes."
Roger Clark once observed that this paragraph operates as a
"sort of Martens clause," 2 13 which "insists that just because" some
crimes are not dealt with by the ICC "does not mean that there is now
impunity for them." 214 The Statute recognizes and respects healthy
interfaces between the Court and sovereign jurisdictions that are
obligated to prosecute offenses when those crimes fall outside the
jurisdiction of the Court. The entire fabric of the Statute compels the
conclusion the Court was not intended to subsume all other forms of
jurisdiction by virtue of its exclusivity as a regime within
international law. Hence, a jurisdictional finding under Article
12(2)(a) that relies upon the premise that the ICC has inherent
authority to negate domestic jurisdiction would undermine the actual
object and purpose of the Rome Statute.
To conclude this Part, the Rome Statute does not create such an
isolated (or self-contained) regime based on its text or its relationship
to the general principles of international law. The ILC Study on
Fragmentation highlighted the reality that "whole fields of functional
specialization ... are described as self-contained.. . in the sense that
special rules and techniques of interpretation are thought to
apply." 215 Quite apart from the complementarity framework as

210.
Florian Jessberger, Internationalv. National Prosecutionof International
Crimes, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 208
(Antonio Cassese ed., 2009).
Rome Statute, supra note 1, Preamble 4.
211.
Id. Preamble 1 6.
212.
213.
See, e.g., Preamble to The Hague Regulations Concerning the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899 [hereinafter Martens Clause]. The so-called
Martens Clause appeared in the Preamble to the 1899 Hague Regulations and is
substantially replicated in the Preamble to the 1907 Hague Regulations, the 1949
Geneva Conventions, the Preamble of Additional Protocol II, and Article 1(2) of
Additional Protocol I. It states: "[u]ntil a more complete code of the laws of war is
issued, the High Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included
in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the
protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the
usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and the
requirements of the public conscience."
214.
OTTO TRIFFTERER, COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 13 (2008).
129 (including examples in investment
215 ILC Fragmentation Study, supra note 18,
law, the law of the sea, human rights law, WTO law, EU law, humanitarian law, space
law, energy law, etc.).
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augmented by Article 98, the Statute incorporates the notion of
distributed domestic enforcement with a textual "Rule of
specialty." 216 Article 101 provides that anyone "surrendered to the
Court under this Statute shall not be proceeded against, punished or
detained for any conduct committed prior to surrender, other than the
conduct or course of conduct which forms the basis of the crimes for
which that person has been surrendered. '2 17 This is one reason why
the Prosecutor must "notify all States Parties and those States which,
taking into account the information available, would normally
exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned" before proceeding
2 18
with an investigation based on her/his own authority.
States have the opportunity both to challenge the Court's
jurisdiction 2 19 and to validate their own right to extradition 2 20 in
particular cases. The predominate role of consent-based jurisdiction,
combined with the power of complementarity, mean that the Court
does not have discretion to invent its own sui generis jurisdictional
principles. The object and purpose of the Rome Statute is to create
and sustain a supranational institution that operates in conjunction
with the domestic judicial systems of states around the world to
minimize or (ideally) eliminate the ability of perpetrators to commit
acts of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity with no
fear of criminal sanction. Framed another way, nothing in the text of
the Statute or the negotiating history compels the conclusion that the
Court operates as a specialized judicial mechanism whose
institutional interests trump any competing domestic domain.
Secondly, as a natural extension of the foregoing, when any
expert thinks of the field of "international criminal law," the Court is
a necessary component, but not the exhaustive exemplar. The ILC
noted that "no self-contained regime is a 'closed legal circuit.' 22 1
"While a special/treaty regime has (as lex specialis) priority in its
sphere of application, that sphere should normally be interpreted in
the way exceptions are, that is, in a limited way."2 22 The ILC
specifically noted that general rules of international law supplement
any treaty-based regime "to the extent that no special derogation is
provided or can be inferred from the instrument(s) constituting the
regime." 2 2 3 Article 21 of the Rome Statute mirrors this tenet by
specifically requiring the Court to apply "where appropriate,
applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law"

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 101.
Id. art. 101(1).
Id. art. 18(1).
Id. art. 19(2).
Id. art. 90.
ILC Fragmentation Study, supra note 18,
152(3).
Id.
Id. T 152(2).
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as well as "general principles of law derived by the Court from
national laws of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate,

the national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction
over the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent
22 4

with this Statute."

Nothing in the Rome Statute provides for derogation from the
principle nemo plus iuris transferrepotest quam ipse habet. Neither is
there a textual basis for requiring ICC prosecution of perpetrators
that fall within domestic jurisdictions. Multinational corporations
cannot improve their actual jurisdictional position by leveraging
corporate subsidiaries based abroad to capitalize upon otherwise nonapplicable conventions. 2 25 In like manner, no State Party can
transfer territorial jurisdiction to the Court that it has already
surrendered by other agreements. Absent a finding that the exclusive
jurisdiction of a sending state guarantees impunity in violation of jus
cogens norms, the Court must respect the underlying treaty-based
jurisdictional allocation.
IV. ADVERSE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LARGER LAW OF TREATIES
Normative shifts in the legal structures for regulating interstate
conduct never develop as a tabula rasa, nor do they march with the
linear certainty of mathematical extrapolation or algebraic formulae.
Law does not appear in a vacuum. The attempt by the OTP to
disregard treaty-based jurisdictional arrangements between states
will provide an important barometer for the developing law of treaty
conflicts. If international law functions as an integrated system in
accordance with the ILC view, treaty norms adapt to shifting contexts
and emerging challenges. Nevertheless, states do not construct treaty
obligations in isolation because treaty norms establish state
expectations and shape correlative rights. Parties to treaties
therefore normally express their intentions regarding actual or
perceived conflicts between treaty provisions precisely because of
shifting valuations and the inevitable tide of technological innovation
and political interaction. The Rome Statute expressly acknowledges
the duty of the Court to interpret the Statute in conformity with the
larger body of treaty norms.
Expansion of ICC authority under Article 12 would strike a
discordant chord in the larger dance of international treaty design.

Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(1).
224.
225.
Mihaly International Corporation v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri
Lanka, Award, 41 I.L.M. 867 24 (2002) ("[I]f Mihaly (Canada) had a claim which was
procedurally defective against Sri Lanka before ICSID because of Mihaly (Canada)'s
inability to invoke the ICSID Convention, Canada not being a Party thereto, this defect
could not be perfected vis-a-vis ICSID by its assignment to Mihaly (USA).").
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The relationship between the Rome Statute and other treaties needs
to be clarified because the Rome Statute is silent on any preclusive
effect. Unlike the Terrorist Bombing Convention, for example, the
Rome Statute contains no express clause that modifies the
226
substantive content or legal effect of bilateral extradition treaties.
Neither does it contain any presumption of automatic superiority
akin to Article 103 of the UN Charter by which the obligations of
states under the UN Charter "prevail" over "any other international
agreement" that conflicts with the Charter. 227 Nor have States
Parties concluded any agreements to modify the effects of earlier
jurisdictional allocations either between themselves or vis-a-vis nonStates Parties. 22 8 Absent any hint that Afghanistan or Palestine
intended to abrogate earlier jurisdictional treaties or suspend their
operation, the default approach across divergent fields of
international law is to seek interpretations that harmonize the two
sets of treaties. 229 An imposed abrogation of the underlying treaties
by the OTP or the Pre-Trial Chambers would represent a definitive
rejection of the precept that the Rome Statute should '%e interpreted
as producing, and intended to produce effects in accordance with
existing law and not in violation of it."'2 30 This is, after all, precisely
what Article 21 of the Rome Statute purports to require. As a matter
of transnational treaty practice, it would be extraordinary for a
supranational court to simply infer the intent of parties to abrogate
earlier agreements by virtue of accession to the subsequent
multilateral treaty.
At a minimum, if it became the accepted norm of transnational
practice, the OTP policy would contravene key provisions of the
VCLT. 2 3 1 The Court has been clear to date that the "interpretation of
treaties, and the Rome Statute is no exception, is governed by the
VCLT, specifically the provisions of Articles 31 and 32."232 The VCLT
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contains few genuine treaty innovations and largely refines extant
customary international law. 2 33 The vast majority of its precepts are
grounded in widely accepted international practice. 2 34 In submitting
the VCLT to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent, President
Nixon noted the treaty's benefits in providing "clear, well defined, and
2 35
readily accessible rules of international law applicable to treaties."
The general rules of treaty interpretation prescribed by VCLT Article
31 mean that the phrase "on the territory of which the conduct
occurred" found in Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute must be
interpreted by the Court in light of the "object and purpose" of the
Rome Statute. ICC case law indicates that the "purpose" should be
gleaned from "the wider aims of the law as may be gathered from its
preamble and the general tenor of the treaty." 236 Similarly, the
Appeals Chamber has made plain that "supplementary means of
interpretation," to include the travauxprparatoiresmay well provide
the dispositive meaning to guide ICC practice under the Rome
Statute in accordance with VCLT Article 32.237
There are no indications in either the text or negotiating history
of the Rome Statute that its provisions should be interpreted in a
manner that would impede accountability of perpetrators under
domestic law when merited (as exemplified in the Admissibility
regime); predictably undermine international peace and security (by
dissuading states from entering into Peacekeeping Operations
2006), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocsldoc/doc183558.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5AZ.WDQ4]
(archived Feb. 27, 2016).
233.
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234.
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courts). But see Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S.
Treaty Interpretation, 44 VA. J. IN'L L. 431, 474-75 (2004) (raising independent
concerns about the ability of the Vienna Convention to bind American judges).
235.
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The State Department specifically noted that the Vienna Convention would contribute
significantly to the "stability of treaty relationships" because it was (and largely
remains) "the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice." Id.
236.
See Situation in the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo, ICC-01/04, at 33.
237.
See Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-522, Judgment on the appeal
of Mr. Germain Katanga Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I Entitled
"Decision on the Defense Request Concerning Languages",
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Chamber turns under article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties").
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because the UN Standard Agreement is invalid in the ICC); or
undermine the due process rights of perpetrators (by preventing
states from negotiating SOFA provisions designed to protect those
rights). Thus, the text of Article 12(2)(a), when read in light of the
tenets of VCLT Articles 31 and 32, should lead the Court to preserve
the binding nature of SOFA provisions because the intent of the
parties, subsequent state practice, and the relevant rules of
international law are all aligned.
Because States have the "primary responsibility for investigating
and prosecuting" ICC crimes, Pre-Trial Chamber I held that the
"Statute cannot be interpreted as permitting a State to permanently
abdicate its responsibilities by referring a wholesale of present and
future criminal activities comprising the whole of its territory,
without any limitation whether in context or duration. Such an
interpretation would be inconsistent with the proper functioning of
the principle of complementarity." 2 38 In other words, ICC precedent
already indicates that the best interpretation of Article 12(2)(a) is one
that best preserves a healthy synergy between domestic jurisdictions
and the territorial scope of ICC power.
Furthermore, there is nothing whatsoever in the negotiating
history of the Rome Statute or its accepted text that indicates any
intention to upend the established precepts of the VCLT. Of
particular relevance to the OTP action, Article 30(4)(b) expressly
provides the default rule for situations such as the attempt to impose
multilateral treaty obligations to non-States Parties. 239 The
Convention specifies that "When the parties to the later treaty do not
include all the parties to the earlier one ... as between a State party
to both treaties and a State party to only one of the treaties, the
treaty to which both States are parties governs their mutual rights
and obligations." 240 In other words, the Court cannot unilaterally
extend the Rome Statute to cover nationals of the United States or
Israel in violation of prior bilateral treaties because they are not
States Parties to the Rome Statute. In both instances, the default
rule of Article 30 requires that the legal duties owed by the states to
each other flow from their binding bilateral treaties that specifically
allocate personal jurisdiction. Framed slightly differently, under the
Vienna Convention framework, the lex specialis of the bilateral
jurisdictional arrangements takes precedence over the broader

238.
See Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10-451, Decision on the
"Defense Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court', J 21 (Oct. 26, 2011), https://
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VCLT, supra note 24, art. 30(4)(b).
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response to treaty conflicts." Borgen, supra note 17, at 450.
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obligation of only one state arising from the more general multilateral
241
treaty that also allots criminal jurisdiction.
Similarly, Article 54(b) of the Convention requires that states
cannot simply release themselves at will from binding legal
obligations. 2 42 As Emer de Vattel noted in 1758, it is a
settled point of natural law, that he who has made a promise to any one, has
conferred upon him a real right to require the thing promised, -- and
consequently, that the breach of a perfect promise is a violation of another's
rights, and as evidently an act of injustice, as it would be to rob a man of his
property. The tranquility, the happiness, the security of the human race,
wholly depend on justice - on the obligation of paying a regard to the rights of
others.

24 3

Article 54 was adopted by a vote of 105 votes to none and reflects a
commonsense extension of the pacta sunt servanda principle that
preserves the "principle of the sovereignty of States which remain
masters of their treaties."2 44 The ICC ought not lightly cast aside
such well-established tenets of treaty law. The current OTP policy
reflects institutional tunnel vision that damages the larger debates
over treaty-based rights and duties.
This Part concludes with two pragmatic warnings if the Court
invalidates the underlying jurisdictional treaties on its own authority
by superimposing the Rome Statute as the pinnacle of a newly
created treaty hierarchy.
A. Disadvantagesof a Purely FormalistApproach
Experts have noted that "no set of black letter rules can fully
respond to the multitude of potential treaty conflicts." 24 5 The
precise interrelationships
between
formulae
for describing
multilateral treaties and the plethora of other agreements is complex
because there is no definitive hierarchy that governs in the absence of
clear expressions of intent by the parties. As the ILC noted, the
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concurrent pragmatic validity of both the lex posteriorand the lex prior maxims
may follow from the way the two derive from different domestic analogies.
Where lex posterior projects international rules as analogous to domestic
legislation (later laws regularly overruling earlier ones), the lex prior suggests
246
an analogy to domestic contracts.

There is no definitive state practice establishing authoritative
sequencing of treaty conflicts, and the Rome Statute does not fit
neatly into either a legislative or contractual straitjacket.
The ICC is caught on the horns of a dilemma because either of
the traditional formalist approaches deprives it of authoritative
jurisdiction over Americans or Israelis. The lex prior principle, by
which the earlier treaty remains binding, is most commonly
applicable where there is divergence between the parties to the
respective treaties. 24 7 By definition, any Court interaction with nonStates Parties would be governed by this principle insofar as existing
agreements establishing the exclusive jurisdiction of sending states
would preclude jurisdiction under the Rome Statute.
On the other hand, imposing a flat lex posterior rule would
undermine the basic concept of pacta sunt servanda, by which the
consent of all the parties to the bilateral treaties would be required
for their termination. 248 The Court cannot impose the Rome Statute
in toto onto non-States Parties because it would require alternative
findings that plainly undermine assertion of ICC jurisdiction. Either
"all the parties" to the earlier jurisdictional treaties must manifest an
intention that the Rome Statute supersedes the bilateral
jurisdictional arrangements, or the Court must decide that Article 12
by its nature is "so far incompatible with the [earlier jurisdictional
arrangements] that the two treaties are not capable of being applied
at the same time."2 4 9 As shown above, the provisions of the Rome
Statute itself leave little room for a Court finding that it is always
"incompatible" with other treaties.
No lawyer, politician, or prosecutor can demonstrate definitive
positive authority that either Palestine or Afghanistan can lawfully
convey unqualified territorial jurisdiction to the Court in violation of
earlier agreements. Similarly, there is no express or implied
agreement by any of the four states (Afghanistan/United States and
Israel/Palestine) by which the earlier treaties can be authoritatively
deemed irrelevant. Circumstances on the ground indicate that all four
states would strongly oppose the presumption of the Court that they
assent to invalidating the earlier treaties.
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At the same time, imposition of a lex posterior principle would
impose a seemingly intractable practical problem for the Court. The
Palestinian acceptance of the Rome Statute in January 2015 might be
deemed by the Court as suitable lex posterior to override the
conflicting jurisdictional provisions of the Oslo Accords. However, the
entry into force of the U.S./ Afghanistan agreement that provides for
exclusive jurisdiction by American authorities effective May 28, 2003,
came subsequent to Rome Statute accession by Afghanistan on May
1, 2003. In other words, applying a lex posteriorprinciple cannot lead
to ICC jurisdiction over both situations in an intellectually consistent
manner. The Court would quickly find itself amidst a bog of
contradictory explanations of its treaty-based authority under the
Rome Statute. This would inevitably produce the prospect of
widespread backlash over its perceived reformation of treaty
practices.
B. The Dangerof Subjective Functionalism
On the other hand, despite the danger of strengthening
perceptions that its decisions are driven by raw politics and narrow
institutional interests, the Court might well be willing to impose
jurisdiction over Americans and Israelis based upon its faith in the
larger purpose of the Rome Statute. After all, both Israel and the
United States have been staunch supporters of universal jurisdiction
in contexts where domestic fora are demonstrably inadequate to
address the grievous crimes within the subject matter jurisdiction of
the ICC. For some scholars, the absence of an official negotiating
history of the ICC could be framed as a blessing in disguise. From
this perspective, the Court is arguably free to innovate international
law by stressing that its constitutive document is unshackled from
expectations rooted from the historic record. Court proponents hope
that the interpretation of the Statute will shift over time akin to a
national constitution that is flexible enough to meet changing needs
of States Parties and the ceaseless flow of world events. It is true that
there is nothing in the Statute that expressly addresses the
relationship between the treaty text and previous SOFA agreements
that limit the jurisdictional authority of the territorial state.
However, the aspiration that the overarching imperative of
strengthening the supranational Court warrants evisceration of every
treaty barrier seems to represent a facile functionalism. Neither is
there any evidence that States Parties themselves intended to
empower the Court to override bilateral SOFA provisions.
In the first place, accepting the premise that the tenet nemo plus
iuris transferrepotest quam ipse habet has become a rule of desuetude
would defeat the object and purpose of an entire class of binding
agreements that remain vital to community efforts to build
international peace and security. Roman jurists maintained that
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pactum (as in pacta sunt servanda) emanated from the same
etymological roots as pax.250 ICC efforts to invalidate SOFA
provisions could paradoxically threaten to undermine international
peace and security because they would without doubt disincentivize
UN peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations. Even when
states have an overwhelming right to exercise collective self-defense,
institutionalized doubt over the utility of SOFAs could prevent
formation of coalitions. Thus, the ICC could undermine one of its
most aspirational objectives-to benefit international order and
buttress the role of law as a bulwark against unlawful aggression.
The challenge is to formulate principles for treaty interrelationships
that support the "community interest in both stability and change" in
order to "identify destructive practices for future regulation, so that
international agreements can be relied on as effective factors in
international behavior and, in the longer run, precipitate
fundamental constitutive changes." 25 1 By invalidating SOFAs and
other jurisdictional allocations, the ICC would undermine the
sanctity of binding agreements between states by elevating
multilateral agreements not intended to create rights and obligations
2 52
for non-Parties.
Secondly, a newly promulgated doctrine of multilateral treaty
superiority that automatically invalidates earlier bilateral treaties
would fly in the face of strong precedents. Article 54 of the VCLT
accepts the premise that the termination of a treaty "necessarily
[deprives] all the parties of all their rights and, in consequence, the
consent of all of them [was] necessary."2 53 Given its unanimous
adoption, Article 54 represents l'expression du droit coutumier. This
echoes the premise of the International Court of Justice in the Case of
the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943, whereby whenever a
third party State's interests "form the very subject matter of the
decision" the Court "cannot

. .

25 4
. give a decision on that issue."

Other tribunals have reinforced the notion that "it is only in the most
compelling circumstances that a tribunal charged with the
application of international law and governed by that law should
depart from a principle laid down [by] the International Court of
Justice." 255 Fidelity to these established treaty norms denies the
supranational forum of power to impose its treaty-based jurisdiction
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as a matter of supranational prerogative when such assertion
abrogates a clear manifestation of prior state consent to surrender
256
exclusive jurisdiction over the nationals of another state.
The Court would be hard pressed to persuade states that its
jurisdictional decisions do not address the "very subject" addressed by
specific treaty provisions that preserve the affirmative right to
exercise criminal jurisdiction over their citizens. The SOFA
provisions and the jurisdictional aspects of the Oslo Accords are lex
specialis with respect to the permissible scope of territorial
jurisdiction. Thus, the territorial states (Afghanistan and Palestine)
face the reality of clearly contradictory treaties. There is no principle
of international law to permit subordination of explicit treaty rights
of non-States Parties through ratification of a multilateral treaty by
another State. Similarly, processes for resolving treaty conflicts
disputes on the intra-state level remain inadequate to resolving the
precise conflict. They provide scant guidance for practitioners or
judges even though they represent "the highest measure of common
ground that could be found among governments as well as in the
Commission on this question." 25 7 It is true that the ICC is not a
sovereign state, so there might be some basis to assert that it is free
to experiment in its relations with sovereign states. Imbuing the ICC
with a robust entrepreneurial independence might be portrayed as a
manifestation of its importance as a symbol of global interdependence
in confronting the enduring problem of criminal impunity.
However, the ICC is inescapably a creature of its constitutive
treaty. The default principle that States should resolve treaty
conflicts by mutual consent remains paramount, so why should the
same premise evaporate in the context of a supranational court
created via a multilateral treaty? States that surrender their
sovereign authority to exercise territorial jurisdiction over a defined
class of person or under certain conditions may act to reclaim that
sovereign authority. Even if it is seen as an organ created by states to
implement their duty to prosecute egregious violations of
international norms, the fact remains that the ICC has no
adjudicative power that does not originate from the consent of
sovereign states.
Because the entire authority of the Court derives from the
consent of states as manifested in adoption or accession to the Rome
Statute, there is no definitive basis for presuming that the Court is at
liberty to expand its own jurisdictional authority. As noted above,
states expressly rejected the formulation of the ICC as an
embodiment of universal jurisdiction. It logically follows that the ICC
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has no independent authority apart from that delegated by sovereign
states. Inventing a rule that multilateral treaties, even one of great
import such as the Rome Statute, take precedence over binding
bilateral mechanisms would transform international treaty law,
despite the reality that there is "no significant practice on the
matter." 25 8 Such fundamental reforms ought to be the province of
states rather than a supranational tribunal that seeks to impose its
vision over non-consenting states. The ICC is the object of the Rome
Statute and not its signatory; thus, sovereign states are properly
positioned to determine its place within the larger constellation of
international treaties.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Some discerning readers will have been troubled throughout
their reading by the use of the word "aggrandize" in the abstract of
this Article. That word implies an intentional exploitation of legal
authorities and might be perceived to impute ill will and excess
politicization into every act of the ICC. Rather than disparaging the
Court or its aspirations, this Article is intended to represent a
dispassionate explication of the linkage between the highly
controversial situations that the Court faces and the larger firstprinciples of treaty law and international practice. While an invalid
assertion of jurisdiction by the ICC is important in its own right,
these assertions have a greater significance for the international law
of treaties, and the project of international criminal law in particular.
The maturation of the ICC as the culmination of supranational
institution building need not necessarily mark the end of the line for
the field of international criminal law. On the contrary, rather than
facing the unending prospect of politicized justice at the whims of a
permanent Court, 259 processes within the ICC should serve to
strengthen the Court's legitimacy.
Squarely addressing the reality that the Rome Statute presents
states with a specific form of treaty conflict in the areas that are most
central to their national security interests might mark a whole new
phase of qualitative growth for the Court that deepens its
institutional breadth and justifies the faith of States Parties. The
danger is that the Court will pursue its narrow vision of jurisdiction
in "disregard of founding principles of international law as well as
general principles of law that are common to the main legal systems
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of the world. '2 60 In the words of Pre-Trial Chamber I "Such an
interpretation would be inconsistent with the proper functioning of
the principle of complementarity. 2 6 1 Readers will be hard-pressed to
discover any legal system in the world that would ignore the basic
precept of law and morality that is preserved by the ancient Roman
tenet nemo plus iuris transferrepotest quam ipse habet. Overlooking
that foundational principle would represent a radical reshaping of the
Court's intended jurisdictional competence.
This conclusion has been heretofore unacknowledged by the
Court. It will doubtless be unpleasant for Court proponents to
confront; it is nonetheless unavoidable given a good faith reading of
the Statute in light of the larger precepts of international treaty law.
In perhaps his most famous observation, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes noted that the
life of the law has never been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities
of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public
policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with
their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do with the syllogism in
2 62
determining the rules by which men should be governed.

Amidst a world of legal and political uncertainty, the ICC should not
settle for long-term reliance on intuitive fine-tuning that pretends
that the Rome Statute operates in isolation from other treaty-based
constraints on sovereign prerogatives. 2 63 Rather than being a
hallmark of its demise, then, the role of the Court as one component
of a healthy transnational system would be enhanced by good faith
judgments that the Court has no lawful basis of jurisdiction over
crimes committed by Americans in Afghanistan, or over offenses
alleged against Israeli citizens for acts committed in the Occupied
Territories or in the Gaza Strip.
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